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 Progressives thought they had cause to celebrate. A Democrat in the 
White House, a Senate controlled by Democrats, and two announced 
Supreme Court vacancies in less than a one-year period. The stars 
appeared to be aligned perfectly—not just one, but two opportunities for 
bold nominations of liberal judicial visionaries, like the icons of the 
Warren Court, to battle the Roberts Court’s conservative stalwarts, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
 The first appointment opportunity even arrived early during the first 
year of President Barack Obama’s first term, an optimal window for 
Presidents to secure confirmation.
1
 The Democrats controlled fifty-nine 
seats in the Senate, with one more Democratic Senator most likely on 
the way as an election contest was winding down,
2
 minimizing the 
 *  Godwin Ronquillo PC Research Professor and Professor of Law, South Texas 
College of Law. I would like to thank Brian Carl for his outstanding research assistance on 
this Article. 
 1. Justice David Souter announced he would retire at the end of the October 2008 
Supreme Court Term on May 1, 2009, less than four months after President Obama’s 
inauguration on January 20, 2009. Based on past history, the President has the greatest 
likelihood of a judicial nominee being confirmed during the first year of the term, with the odds 
of confirmation decreasing each subsequent year. See, e.g., Garland W. Allison, Delay in Senate 
Confirmation of Federal Judicial Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 8, 10-11 (1996); JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 200-01 
(2002). The last year of a presidential term, in which the President is either a lame duck or in 
the midst of an election, is especially bad, as in a number of instances the Senate has delayed 
consideration of the nomination in order to keep the vacancy for the next President to fill. See
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 31 (5th ed. 2008) (listing a dozen 
historical examples); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 123 (rev. 
ed. 2003) (discussing study finding a ninety percent confirmation rate during the first three 
years of a presidential term, but less than sixty-seven percent the last year).
 2. After the nomination was announced, but before confirmation hearings began, 
Democrat Al Franken was sworn in as the Senator from Minnesota, giving the Democrats sixty 
seats in the Senate. Monica Davey & Carl Hulse, Minnesota Court Rules Democrat Won Senate 
Seat, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1; Dana Milbank, The Al Franken Decade Begins 30 Years 
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likelihood of any potential filibuster.
3
 The President also enjoyed a 
public approval rating of approximately sixty-five percent during the 
weeks between Justice Souter’s resignation announcement and his 
nominee’s introduction.
4
 It appeared that any nominee acceptable to the 
members of his own party would be confirmed easily. 
 But, despite these favorable circumstances, President Obama 
refrained from a bold nomination of a progressive visionary.
5
 Instead, 
President Obama opted for a rather predictable (and politically 
expedient) nominee, Judge Sonia Sotomayor.
6
 I describe the nomination 
as predictable primarily because I predicted it on a live radio program 
three days after Justice Souter announced his resignation and weeks 
before the nomination was announced.
7
 It is not that I claim any special 
powers of foresight—instead, the nomination followed the fairly typical, 
recent pattern of “promoting” sitting judges of the federal circuit courts 
of appeals. These promotions typically involve judges with impeccable 
academic and professional credentials but without too much of a paper 
trail on controversial political and judicial issues, such as abortion, 
privacy rights, affirmative action, gay and lesbian rights, and gun 
rights.
8
 Judge Sotomayor not only perfectly fit these usual criteria, but 
she is also an embodiment of the American dream, rising from 
Late, WASH. POST, July 7, 2009, at A2. 
 3. Under Senate rules, sixty Senators can invoke cloture and end a filibuster. S. Doc. No. 
110-9, at 16 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
110_cong_documents&docid=f:sd009b.110.pdf. One study concluded that the Senate confirms 
ninety percent of the Supreme Court nominees when it is controlled by the President’s party, 
but only fifty-nine percent when the President’s party is in the minority. SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 1, at 201. 
 4. Jeffrey M. Jones, Obama Approval Compares Favorably to Prior Presidents, GALLUP
(May 29, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/118928/obama-approval-compares-favorably-prior-
presidents.aspx (noting Obama averaged a sixty-five percent job approval rating in May 2009). 
President Obama’s approval rating, however, had dropped approximately ten percent by the 
time of the confirmation vote. Jeffrey M. Jones, Amid Debate, Obama Approval Rating on 
Healthcare Steady, GALLUP (Aug. 12, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/122255/amid-debate-
obama-approval-rating-healthcare-steady.aspx (noting an August approval rate of fifty-four 
percent). According to one study, the President’s approval rating has been a better predictor of 
a Senator’s confirmation vote than the Senator’s own party affiliation. See SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 1, at 206-13. 
 5. See Shahid Buttar, Bush v. Gore Rears Its Head (Part III): Souter’s Resignation as an 
Invitation to Balance a Politicized Court, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 2009, 3:34 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shadid-buttar/bush-v-gore-rears-its-hea_b_201947.html
(identifying Professor Pamela Karlan and Governor Jennifer Granholm as bold, visionary 
choices); Dahlia Lithwick, The Sad State of the Liberal Law Student, SLATE (Apr. 15, 2010, 
6:39PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2249535 (identifying Dawn Johnsen, Eric Holder, Pamela 
Karlan, John Payton, Laurence Tribe, Goodwin Liu, David Cole, and Walter Dellinger as 
progressive legal champions). 
 6. Ralph Lindeman, Senate Votes 68-31 to Confirm Sotomayor to Seat on Supreme Court,
78 U.S.L.WK. 2073 (2009). 
 7. NewsRadio 740, KTRH (May 4, 2009, 11:09:35AM), available at www.ktrh.com/cc-
common/podcast/single_podcast.html?podcast=newscasts.xml. I did mention one other possible 
female federal appellate judge, but named Judge Sotomayor first. 
 8. See infra Parts II.C, II.D & III. 
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humble beginnings to the pinnacle of success.
9
 And, of course, the 
nomination of the first Latina to the Court undoubtedly was a shrewd 
political move designed to secure additional Hispanic support for the 
Democratic Party.
10
 Her confirmation was a foregone conclusion from 
the beginning.
11
 Although the political conditions surrounding President Obama’s 
second opportunity to nominate a Supreme Court Justice were not quite 
as favorable, the Republicans seemed to have little realistic hope of 
derailing the President’s nominee when Justice John Paul Stevens 
announced, approximately fifteen months into Obama’s tenure as 
President, that he would retire at the end of the October 2009 Term.
12
The Democrats, at that time, still enjoyed a significant numerical 
advantage over the Republicans in the Senate, even though they no 
longer controlled the sixty votes necessary to invoke cloture and end a 
filibuster.
13
 While the President’s public approval numbers had dropped 
 9. Judge Sotomayor was raised by her Puerto Rican parents in the housing projects of 
the Bronx. Scott Shane & Manny Fernandez, A Judge’s Own Story Highlights Her Mother’s,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A16. Her father, a factory worker, passed away when she was 
nine, and her mother worked as a nurse to support the family. Id.
 10. See, e.g., Ellis Cose, What Sotomayor Is Starting: The Evolution of Latino Politics,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 2009, at 29 (opining that, although the Republican opposition to 
Sotomayor’s confirmation would not have short-term effects on the midterm elections, it would 
drive more Latinos from the Republican Party); Kathy Kiely, Sotomayor Confirmed with Few 
GOP Votes, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/ 
2009-08-05-sotomayor_N.htm (explaining Democrats view the nomination as an opportunity to 
cement the political loyalties of an ethnic group comprising fifteen percent of the American 
population); Kathy Kiely, Republican Support for Sotomayor Looks Paltry, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 
2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-08-03-sotomayor_N.htm (noting 
Democrats hope to capitalize on Republican Party’s opposition to Sotomayor with “the nation’s 
fastest-growing voting bloc”). My description of Judge Sotomayor as the first Latina Justice 
obviates the need to address whether Justice Benjamin Cardozo, a descendant of Sephardic 
Jews from the Iberian Peninsula, should be considered the first Hispanic Justice. My own view 
is that, irrespective of the resolution of Justice Cardozo’s ethnicity, Justice Sotomayor is 
undoubtedly the first Supreme Court Justice projecting a Hispanic identity. She has frequently 
characterized herself as a Latina. See, e.g., Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87 (2002). There is no similar evidence that Justice Cardozo ever 
viewed himself as Latino or Hispanic. See ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 3-4, 6-8 (1998) 
(describing the importance of Cardozo’s Sephardic Jewish ancestry). 
 11. On August 6, 2009, the Senate confirmed her as the 111th Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in a sixty-eight to thirty-one vote. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Paul 
Kane, Sotomayor Wins Confirmation: Senate Votes 68 to 31 for Judge Who Will Be First 
Hispanic to Serve on High Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2009, at A1. During her confirmation 
hearings, Senator Lindsey Graham acknowledged that she would be confirmed in the absence 
of a “complete meltdown,” which he did not envision would occur. Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 26 (2009) 
[hereinafter Sotomayor Hearing] (statement of Sen. Graham). 
 12. See James Oliphant et al., Battle Looms as Justice Stevens Says He’s Retiring, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/10/nation/la-na-justice-stevens10-
2010apr10.
 13. See id. Massachusetts’ election of Republican Senator Scott Brown to replace deceased 
Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy had resulted in fifty-nine—rather than sixty—Democratic 
Senators. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Stevens’s Retirement Is Political Test for 
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into the slightly negative range, the President appeared to have been 
granted a final opportunity—especially with looming midterm elections 
that would likely curtail his partisan support in the Senate—for 
appointing “an assertively liberal” jurist.
14
 But once again, the President’s choice was measured. Although he 
bucked the almost three-decade trend of nominating a sitting federal 
appellate judge, thereby ensuring that the Roberts Court would no 
longer be comprised solely of Justices who previously had served as 
judges on a circuit court,
15
 his choice was hardly a progressive 
revolutionary. Solicitor General Elena Kagan had a distinguished—
albeit relatively brief—career in both academia and government service. 
She had been confirmed a little over a year earlier as Solicitor General, 
the first woman to hold that post, and had argued six cases on behalf of 
the United States Government in front of the Supreme Court in her 
position as the so-called “Tenth Justice.”
16
 Before her appointment as 
Solicitor General, her six-year tenure as dean of the Harvard Law 
School won her accolades from across the ideological spectrum for her 
recruitment of several high-profile conservative professors, her efforts 
to improve the collegiality of the institution, and her fund-raising 
abilities.
17
 Her paper trail on controversial political and judicial issues 
was not long, especially for an academic—indeed, her scholarship 
provided little insight on her overarching judicial philosophy, 
decisionmaking methodology, or doctrinal views, except for her support 
of First Amendment values (even when in conflict with other 
progressive ideals),
18
 her essentially pragmatic approach to 
administrative law issues related to the institutional interrelationship 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/politics/10stevens.html.  
 14. Oliphant et al., supra note 12. As Justice Stevens announced his retirement, 
President Obama’s weekly job approval rating fell to forty-seven percent, the lowest of his 
administration to that date. Frank Newport, Obama Weekly Approval at 47%, Lowest Yet by 
One Point, GALLUP (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/127316/obama-weekly-
approval-lowest-yet-one-point.aspx.
 15. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial 
Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 833 (2009) [hereinafter Circuit
Effects]. Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor in 2006 marked the first time in the 
Court’s history the entire membership of the Court had been elevated from the federal 
appellate bench. Id. at 833. 
 16. Robert Barnes, In Kagan’s Work As Solicitor General, Few Clues to Her Views, WASH.
POST, May 13, 2010, at A3 (quoting the title of LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987)). Part III contains a more in-depth 
examination of the role of the Solicitor General. 
 17. See Christi Parsons, U. of C. Law Faculty Didn’t Back Kagan, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 
2010, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-kagan-chicago-20100530,0,1471697.story; 
Stolberg & Savage, supra note 13. 
 18. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, When A Speech Code Is A Speech Code: The Stanford Policy 
and the Theory of Incidental Restraint, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 961-65 (1996) (arguing 
against constitutionality of Stanford code prohibiting racist and sexist expression); Elena 
Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 878 
(1993) (arguing that any efforts to regulate pornography and hate speech subverting First 
Amendment premise of viewpoint neutrality would—and should—fail). 
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between agencies and the three branches of government,
19
 and her 
backhanded compliment of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence as infused 
with much “quality and intelligence (even if ultimate wrong-
headedness).”
20
 Although some Republican Senators objected to her 
relative lack of “real-world” experience as a judge and a practicing 
attorney,
21
 several well-known conservatives viewed her favorably and 
much less objectionable than other potential nominees, primarily due to 
her open-minded approach to considering arguments from differing 
ideological perspectives.
22
 While she did not enjoy the same level of 
public support as other recent successful nominees,
23
 which was 
probably partially attributable to her lack of prior experience as a 
judge,
24
 she was easily confirmed as the 112th Justice—and fourth 
female Justice—of the United States Supreme Court.
25
 While both his nominees successfully navigated the path to a 
Supreme Court appointment, why did President Obama fail to 
nominate at least one progressive champion, with a defined 
constitutional vision, when he had a generally supportive Senate and 
(during the first nomination) a favorable political climate? And why did 
he adhere to the typical practice over the last four-plus decades of 
tapping either a sitting jurist or an individual with a close institutional 
relationship to the Supreme Court, rather than selecting a higher 
profile political or philosophical leader? 
 19. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 261-65 (2001) (proposing judicial review of agency decisions should be 
dependent on the level in the administrative hierarchy of the final agency decisionmaker); 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319-31 (2001) (urging 
constitutionality of presidential directives to agency officials within the sphere of their 
delegated discretion unless Congress has delegated the decisionmaking authority to an 
individual agency or has clearly stated a contrary intent). 
 20. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 934 (1995) 
(reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994)).
 21. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Kagan Hearing], 2010 WL 2564591, at **6, 17-18, 
22 (June 28, 2010).
 22. See, e.g., id., at **59, 128 (June 30); Conservative Friends Rise in Support of Kagan,
MSNBC.COM (May 14, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37156197/ns/politics-more_politics/ 
t/conservative-friends-rise-support-kagan/; Ilya Somin, Don’t Dismiss Elena Kagan, FORBES
(May 11, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/11/elena-kagan-supreme-court-opinions-contributors-
ilya-somin.html.
 23. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Support for Confirming Kagan Trails That of Recent 
Nominees, GALLUP (June 4, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/139367/Support-Confirming-
Kagan-Trails-Recent-Nominees.aspx.
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See, e.g., Paul Kane & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Elena Kagan’s Nomination to 
Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2010), http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/08/05/AR2010080505247.html. Republican Senator Orrin Hatch remarked during 
Kagan’s confirmation hearing, “Something tells me this is likely to be your last confirmation 
hearing.” Kagan Hearing, supra note 21, 2010 WL 2564591, at *11 (June 28). 
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 Although both of his selections comport with those made by other 
recent Presidents, it has not always been this way. The Supreme Court 
Justices appointed since our Nation’s founding have had a wide variety 
of backgrounds, including a former President, members of the 
President’s cabinet, other executive branch officials, members of 
Congress, state governors, academics, and even attorneys in private 
practice.
26
 In fact, a number of the great or near-great Justices in the 
annals of the Supreme Court had never been judges or held the Solicitor 
General’s post as the mythical “Tenth Justice” before their 
appointment, including Chief Justices Charles Evans Hughes, Earl 
Warren, and William Rehnquist, and Justices Louis Brandeis, 
Benjamin Curtis, William Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and Joseph 
Story.
27
 Plus, a number of the Supreme Court’s most highly regarded 
jurists had articulated or demonstrated a definitive political or judicial 
vision before their appointment, such as Chief Justices John Marshall 
and William Howard Taft, and Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and 
Robert H. Jackson.
28
 All of these Justices may not be icons to everyone, 
but there is no doubt that without these jurists the United States 
Supreme Court would not be the same institution that it is today. 
 What has changed to account for current preferences in the Supreme 
Court nomination and appointment process? In searching for the 
answer to this question, I begin with the one recent nomination that fell 
outside the parameters of these current preferences, the unsuccessful 
nomination by President George W. Bush of his White House Counsel, 
Harriet E. Miers. I then examine the evolution of the Senate’s 
confirmation practices using the lens of confirmation battles throughout 
American history, demonstrating from these episodes that public 
involvement in the confirmation process, via both institutional and 
political mechanisms, has increased markedly over the last century. 
 I next theorize that, as the Court has become more involved in 
politically charged social issues during recent times, the Court’s 
 26. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 47-49. 
 27. Id. at 42-44 (listing prior federal and state judicial experience of United States 
Supreme Court Justices). Of course, when Hughes and Rehnquist were appointed Chief 
Justice, both had prior federal judicial experience, but neither had any judicial experience 
when initially appointed as an Associate Justice. Hughes was serving as governor of New York 
when he was appointed as an Associate Justice in 1910. He left the Court six years later in an 
unsuccessful bid to become President of the United States, and then subsequently served as 
President of the American Bar Association, Secretary of State for Presidents Harding and 
Coolidge, and a Justice of the Permanent Court of International Justice before being appointed 
Chief Justice of the United States in 1930. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 361-62 (2005). Rehnquist was serving as assistant attorney general for 
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice when he was nominated for the 
Supreme Court. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 252.
 28. Cf. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 66, 124-28, 130-31, 141-44, 160-62, 167-71, 172-76, 182-
85 (discussing backgrounds of Marshall, Holmes, Taft, Brandeis, Cardozo, Black, Frankfurter, 
and Jackson). 
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legitimate exercise of the power of judicial review requires, in the 
public’s eye, a greater separation from ordinary politics. Although “[a]ll 
legal scholars—and judges and lawyers—are in some sense legal 
realists,”
29
 and therefore acknowledge that judicial interpretation 
depends at least partially on the identity of the judge, the extent of that 
realism, at least to large portions of the public, does not currently 
extend to selecting predominantly political actors or inflexible 
doctrinaires to the bench. The perception that Supreme Court Justices’ 
allegiance should be to the Constitution and the law—not to a personal 
ideological or jurisprudential vision, or one side or another in the 
partisan fray—is a powerful image, which may be compromised by 
appointing those recently involved in the ugly game of politics. While 
predominantly critiqued by academics and Court watchers,
30
 Chief 
Justice Roberts struck a powerful chord with the public by his analogy 
of a judge to an umpire calling balls and strikes.
31
 Irrespective of its 
accuracy, that is the current favored public portrait of justice, rather 
than the politician or instrumentalist visionary in robes.
32
 Indeed, 
Judge Sotomayor’s testimony during her confirmation hearing bears 
witness to this fact, as she expressly disavowed President Obama’s 
emphasis on “empathy,” instead presenting a view of the judicial role 
reminiscent of Chief Justice Roberts’ testimony.
33
 This certainly was 
not happenstance.
34
 29. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 589 (2002). 
 30. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (At Least Some of) the Umpire 
Analogy, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 526 n.4 (2009) (collecting critical commentary); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision 
Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006) (positing “it is hard to think of a less apt analogy”); 
Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 
1051 (2006) (“No serious person thinks that the rules that judges in our system apply . . . are 
given to them the way the rules of baseball are given to umpires.”); L.A. Powe, Jr., Judges
Struck by Lightning: Some Observations on the Politics of Recent Supreme Court Appointments,
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 875, 882 (2007) (describing the analogy as “absurd[]”). Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future 
of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 166 (2006) (arguing that “there is 
something to the umpire analogy—although not as much as Justice Roberts’s testimony 
suggests”).
 31. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 (2005) 
[hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee to be Chief Justice 
of the United States). 
 32. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23, 24 
(2007) (noting that the umpire analogy “tapp[ed] into many if not most Americans’ attitudes 
about judges”); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 701, 711 n.38 (2007) (surmising Judge Roberts “may have been politicking by 
telling Senators and the public what he thought they wanted to hear”). 
 33. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 11, at 120-21 (“[J]udges can’t rely on what’s in their 
heart. They don’t determine the law. Congress makes the laws. The job of a judge is to apply 
the law. . . . We don’t apply feelings to facts.”). 
 34. Cf. Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Snoozer for Sotomayor, POLITICO (Aug. 6, 2009, 6:27 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0809/25895.html (noting White House apparently 
acquiesced in Sotomayor’s blunt repudiation of empathy in judging). 
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 As the public has become increasingly involved in the confirmation 
process, the current popular image of judges as neutral referees 
commands additional respect. And this conception has been realized 
through appointing to the High Court those who at least superficially 
appear less enmeshed in identity politics—those engaged in a role in 
the judicial system (especially federal appellate judges) who have 
exhibited a propensity for independent, open-minded decisionmaking. 
Challenging this public conception is a difficult undertaking, as 
President George W. Bush learned the hard way. 
I. THE HARRIET MIERS NOMINATION
35
 The following could accurately describe Supreme Court nominee 
Harriet Miers’ career before she joined the Bush Administration: 
The Republican President’s nominee for the Supreme Court had 
never been a judge—at any level. Instead, the nominee had 
predominantly represented corporate clients since graduating from a 
law school close to home. The nominee’s primary qualifications were 
an extremely successful private practice, admirable service in various 
important positions in state and national bar associations, and active 
involvement in state and local political bodies. Yet because the 
nominee’s career had primarily revolved around representing 
corporations, the nominee’s views on abortion, affirmative action, or 
gay and lesbian rights were unknown. Nor did the nominee have 
relevant prior experience in litigating most of the other myriad of 
constitutional issues the Supreme Court regularly had to confront. 
But this description is also accurate with respect to the prior legal 
experience of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who was confirmed almost 
unanimously by the Senate (with only a single dissenting vote) in 
1971.
36
 Although Ms. Miers and Justice Powell had similar backgrounds 
in many respects, she had to withdraw her nomination for the Supreme 
Court, primarily as a result of stringent opposition from both sides of 
the political spectrum regarding her qualifications for the position and 
her lack of prior constitutional experience. 
 Why the different treatment? One argument might be that, while the 
backgrounds of Lewis Powell and Harriet Miers are similar, they are 
 35. In the interest of full disclosure, I first met Harriet Miers when she was President of 
the State Bar of Texas and then, a few years later when our respective firms merged, I worked 
with her on an appellate matter before she departed for the Bush Administration and I became 
a full-time professor. I, like many attorneys who litigated disputes either with or against her, 
had a high regard for her ethics, professionalism, and legal talents based on that experience. 
See, e.g., William McKenzie, When Conservatives Get to Know Her, They’ll Respect Her, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4, 2005, at 19A; Allen Pusey, Record offers few clues to Miers’ views,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4, 2005, at 1A. Since our departures from Locke Liddell & Sapp 
LLP, we’ve only seen each other or otherwise communicated a handful of times, predominantly 
at bar events or receptions. 
 36. JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 1-10 (1994). 
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not identical. The close-to-home law school Justice Powell attended, 
Washington and Lee, is more prestigious than Harriet Miers’ alma 
mater, Southern Methodist University. Justice Powell graduated first in 
his class, and proceeded to earn an LL.M. from Harvard University 
before beginning his law practice.
37
 Justice Powell also accomplished 
more in national bar associations, as he served as President of both the 
American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Academy of Trial 
Attorneys.
38
 During his time as ABA President, he mostly “talked about 
crime” (despite his utter lack of criminal experience) and frequently 
criticized the decisions of the Warren Court, which led to national 
recognition and an appointment on the Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.
39
 And Lewis Powell’s 
leadership on the Richmond school board and then the board of 
education in Virginia during the aftermath of Brown v. Board of 
Education
40
 was a higher profile political position than being director of 
the Texas Lottery Commission or a one-term member of the Dallas 
City Council.
41
 On the other hand, Harriet Miers’ feats may be more impressive 
because of the gender bias obstacles that she had to overcome. When 
she graduated from law school females were a rarity at prestigious 
Texas law firms, which is aptly illustrated by the fact that she was the 
first female attorney her firm hired.
42
 And she had several other 
trailblazing firsts, including becoming the first female President of the 
State Bar of Texas, the first female managing partner of a major Texas 
law firm, and the first female President of the Dallas Bar Association.
43
Although she was never president of the ABA, she did serve as chair of 
both the Board of Editors for the ABA Journal and the ABA’s 
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice.
44
 She also had her own 
high-profile cause in the ABA, spearheading the failed attempt to have 
the ABA remain neutral regarding abortion rights rather than 
continuing its pro-choice stance.
45
 And, of course, she had served in the  
 37. Id. at 39. 
 38. Id. at 1-10, 195-203. 
 39. Id. at 210-14. 
 40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 41. Cf. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 320. 
 42. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum & Neil A. Lewis, Court in Transition: Woman in the News; 
Hard-Working Advocate for the President, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E5DD1130F937A35753C1A9639C8B63. 
 43. Id.
 44. Harriet E. Miers Profile, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2005; Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, 
Harriet Miers, http://www.lockelord.com/hmiers/ (last visited July 2, 2011). Before she joined 
the Bush Administration, she was one of two candidates for the number two position at the 
American Bar Association, the chair of the House of Delegates. Id. As a result, many viewed 
her as being “on track to become president of the American Bar Association.” Purdum & Lewis, 
supra note 42. 
 45. Purdum & Lewis, supra note 42. 
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executive branch for several years, eventually obtaining the prestigious 
position of White House Counsel.
46
 So why was Justice Powell so overwhelmingly deemed qualified to sit 
on the Supreme Court while Harriet Miers, at least in the minds of 
many, was not? Certainly reports of Ms. Miers’ poor performance in 
interviews with Senators after her nomination led to questions 
regarding her intellectual qualifications for the Court.
47
 But the 
campaign against her appointment began well before these reports 
surfaced.
48
 It is therefore difficult to view these reports as the initial 
cause of the dissatisfaction against her, although certainly they 
provided vital (and probably lethal) ammunition for her detractors. 
 Some have ventured that she was disqualified by the appearance of 
political cronyism through her long-time service as George W. Bush’s 
private attorney and then presidential counsel (in contrast, Justice 
Lewis Powell only met President Richard Nixon once before his 
appointment, and his qualifications greatly exceeded those of other 
potential nominees President Nixon released to the ABA for 
evaluation).
49
 In the past, this would not have been a disqualification, as 
approximately sixty percent of all confirmed Supreme Court Justices 
personally knew their nominating President before their nomination.
50
Yet a variant of this argument, predominantly raised by President 
Bush’s own party, did contribute to her withdrawal.
51
 46. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 320. Interestingly, William Rehnquist also was a legal 
advisor to the White House, serving as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel, when he was first nominated for the Supreme Court by Richard Nixon, who referred 
to him as “the President’s lawyer’s lawyer.” Id. at 252. 
 47. See id. at 320. She also was harmed by the public disclosure of her personal 
correspondence to then-Governor Bush during the 1990s and columns written for the Texas 
Bar Journal while she was president of the State Bar of Texas, which her critics derided as 
fawning and clumsy. See Charles Babington, Miers Hit on Letters and the Law, WASH. POST,
Oct. 15, 2005, at A7. Her candidacy then took another blow when her response to the Judiciary 
Committee’s questionnaire was viewed as inadequate by both the chair and ranking member. 
Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Bush’s Court Choice Ends Bid After Attack by Conservatives,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1; Robin Toner et al., Steady Erosion in Support Undercut 
Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16. 
 48. See, e.g., Patrick J. Buchanan, Miers’ Qualifications Are ‘Non-Existent,’ HUMAN
EVENTS ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=9444 (“[H]er 
qualifications for the Supreme Court are non-existent. She is not a brilliant jurist, indeed, has 
never been a judge.”); Charles Krauthammer, Withdraw this Nominee, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 
2005, at A23 (describing Miers as a constitutional “tabula rasa”). 
 49. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 14-15, 319-20; JEFFERIES, supra note 36, at 10, 219-20. 
 50. JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 251-
52 (2005); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing several examples where personal 
and political friendship was the determinative factor in a presidential nomination); GERHARDT,
supra note 1, at 201 (noting most nominees had a “close personal or professional relationship 
with the president or those responsible for advising the president on the nominations he 
should make”). 
 51. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 320. As Professor Abraham noted, “it is almost impossible for 
the chief executive to select and see confirmed a candidate for the federal bench without the 
approval or at least the tolerance of the political leaders of the candidate’s own party.” Id. at 21. 
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 The crux of the socially conservative opposition was lingering doubts 
regarding her views of the judicial role in areas such as abortion, race 
and sexual orientation discrimination, and privacy rights generally.
52
Yet candidly objecting to the uncertainty of her positions on these 
issues—which deeply divide the American populace—would contradict 
the public’s expectation (and a frequently expressed Republican 
mantra)
53
 that Supreme Court Justices follow the law, not their own 
personal beliefs. So instead, the majority of her conservative opponents 
focused on her supposed lack of relevant experience, immediately 
deriding her qualifications on the day she was nominated as “non-
existent.”
54
 In the colorful words of commentator Charles 
Krauthammer, President Bush nominated “a constitutional tabula rasa 
to sit on what is America’s constitutional court[,] . . . [which was]an 
exercise of regal authority with the arbitrariness of a king giving his 
favorite general a particularly plush dukedom.”
55
 Stated more plainly, 
she had never been a judge, or held another position (such as Solicitor 
General) closely associated with the Supreme Court. She was a political 
appointee, without experience in impartial, nonpartisan 
decisionmaking. She did not have a sufficient understanding of 
constitutional law, preventing her, in today’s parlance, from correctly 
calling “balls and strikes.” And it was these complaints that resonated 
with the public—even though her legal background in many respects 
mirrored that of previously confirmed nominees—rather than the true 
source of her intraparty opposition, which was the depth of her 
ideological commitment to their beliefs. 
 The ready acceptance of the experience complaint indicates that 
background necessary for a Supreme Court appointment has changed. 
A cursory glance at the past confirms that something is afoot. In the 
three decades from 1937 to 1967, only eight of the twenty-one
individuals nominated for the Supreme Court were either sitting judges 
or the Solicitor General,
56
 with only five of the nominees serving on 
 52. See id. at 320. Although her long-time friend, Justice Nathan Hecht of the Texas 
Supreme Court, had repeatedly reaffirmed in interviews that she was pro-life, and earlier in 
her career she had attempted to pass an ABA resolution requiring neutrality in the abortion 
debate (rather than the ABA’s then-existing and still continuing platform supporting the right 
to choose), conservative activists still feared that she was a “stealth nominee” in the mold of 
Justice David Souter who would not sufficiently advance the Republican agenda. See Pusey, 
supra note 35. 
 53. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
555 (2010) (providing numerous examples of Republican political rhetoric against activist 
judges substituting personal views for constitutional commitments). 
 54. Buchanan, supra note 48. 
 55. Krauthammer, supra note 48. 
 56. Justices Wiley B. Rutledge, Sherman Minton, John Marshall Harlan (II), Charles 
Evans Whittaker, and Potter Stewart were serving on the federal courts of appeals when 
nominated for the Supreme Court, Justice William Brennan was serving as a state supreme 
court judge, and Justices Stanley Reed and Thurgood Marshall were each serving as the 
Solicitor General of the United States. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 163-230. Justice Robert 
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federal appellate courts.
57
 In contrast, in the four decades since the 
nominations of Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1971, fourteen of the 
fifteen individuals nominated have been sitting judges or the Solicitor 
General (all except unsuccessful nominee Harriet Miers), with twelve of 
the fifteen serving on federal appellate courts.
58
 It is not that recent 
Presidents have not considered nominations outside these parameters—
President Clinton, for instance, openly approached or strongly 
considered New York Governor Mario Cuomo, Senate Majority Leader 
George Mitchell, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt, and Education 
Secretary Richard Riley, but various political factors interfered with 
nominating each of them.
59
 The reality is, as President Clinton 
learned, that certain experience—particularly (although not 
exclusively) as a federal circuit judge—is now an accepted norm for 
Supreme Court nominees.
60
 But why has this norm developed? Scholars have routinely described 
the phenomenon, but have had difficulty explaining the underlying 
normative reasons for the shift.
61
 In my view, part of the answer is that 
the steady expansion of public participation in the confirmation process 
over the last two centuries has changed the political calculus regarding 
the necessary background experience for the High Court. 
II. THE CHANGING CONFIRMATION PROCESS
 The Constitution does not define the Senate’s role in Supreme Court 
appointments beyond merely stating that it is to provide “[a]dvice and 
[c]onsent;”
62
 thus, the Senate has created its own procedures.
63
 Over the 
H. Jackson had also previously been the Solicitor General, but was Attorney General at the 
time he was nominated to the Court. Id. at 184. 
 57. David A. Yalof, Dress Rehearsal Politics and the Case of Earmarked Judicial 
Nominees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 695 (2005). It was more likely that a Supreme Court 
nominee was a Senator or a member of the President’s Cabinet than a judge during this time—
three Senators, three U.S. Attorneys Generals, one Secretary of the Treasury, and one 
Secretary of Labor were nominated to serve on the Supreme Court from 1937 to 1967. Id.
 58. The twelve nominated federal judges are Justice Stevens in 1975, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in 1986, Judge Robert H. Bork and Justice Kennedy in 1987, 
Justice Souter in 1990, Justice Thomas in 1991, Justice Ginsburg in 1993, Justice Breyer in 
1994, Chief Justice Roberts in 2005, Justice Alito in 2006, and Justice Sotomayor in 2009. 
President Reagan had announced his intention to nominate another federal appellate judge in 
1987, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, but Judge Ginsburg withdrew his name from consideration 
before an official nomination had been made. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was serving as a state 
court appellate judge when she was nominated in 1981, and Justice Elena Kagan was serving as 
Solicitor General of the United States at the time of her nomination in 2010. See ABRAHAM, supra
note 1, at 233-324; Conservative Friends Rise in Support of Kagan, supra note 22. 
 59. Mark Silverstein & William Haltom, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: 
Reflections on the Ginsburg and Breyer Nominations, 12 J.L. & POL. 459, 460-61, 471-72 (1996); 
Yalof, supra note 57, at 696. 
 60. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for 
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 905-10 (2003). 
 61. See Circuit Effects, supra note 15, at 840-68. 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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last two centuries, the Senate’s incremental changes to these 
procedures have had a dramatic cumulative effect on the appointments 
process. Early on, before the Civil War, the Senate’s practices were 
closed, ad hoc, and informal.
64
 While the Senate slightly formalized 
its role in the postbellum period, it was not until after Senators became 
accountable to the public for their election in the early twentieth 
century that the Senate’s practices began slowly evolving into 
today’s model.
65
 The changed mechanics of the Senate’s institutional role in the 
confirmation process transformed the defining characteristics of 
successful and unsuccessful judicial nominations. Retracing the 
evolution of the Senate’s practices and judicial nomination outcomes 
provides a historical perspective for understanding the development of 
the modern expectations regarding Supreme Court nominees. 
A. From the Founding to the Civil War 
 During the tenures of this nation’s first few Presidents, the Senate 
did not have a specified committee to consider judicial nominations, 
instead addressing all but one nomination in the first instance before 
the entire Senate.
66
 In 1816 the Senate first created standing 
committees to assist in the conduct of its business, relying on its power 
to devise rules for its own proceedings as authorization for delegating 
some functions to groups of Senators.
67
 One of the committees created at 
that time was the Senate Judiciary Committee, which was to assist in 
undertaking the Senate’s “[a]dvice and [c]onsent” role.
68
 Yet even after the Judiciary Committee’s creation, the Senate 
confirmation process remained exceedingly informal and hidden from 
public view in the years before the Civil War.
69
 The Senate’s procedures 
 63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing that “[e]ach House may determine the 
Rules of its Proceedings”). 
 64. See infra section II. A.
 65. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
 66. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33225,
SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS, 1789-2009: ACTIONS BY THE SENATE, THE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, AND THE PRESIDENT 5 (2009). The one exception occurred for the nomination of 
Alexander Wolcott in 1811, which was first referred to a select committee composed of three 
Senators. Id. On the same day the select committee reported on his nomination, the Senate 
overwhelmingly rejected his confirmation, with only nine votes in favor and twenty-four 
against. Id. at 20 (Table 1). On a percentage basis, this was the most lopsided full Senate vote 
against confirmation in American history. For the reasons underlying his lack of support, see
infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 67. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 15-16; RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 5. 
 68. Cf. David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 491 (2005) (noting the Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s role in judicial nominations since 1816). 
 69. Cf. JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 88 (1995) 
(opining that current knowledge of the early Supreme Court confirmation process is 
incomplete, due to the want of surviving Judiciary Committee records before the Civil War and 
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at the time required a motion before a nomination could be referred to 
the Judiciary Committee, allowing the Senate to act on approximately 
one out of every three Supreme Court nominations without a 
Committee referral.
70
 Even if the matter was referred to the Judiciary 
Committee, it typically merely reported back to the Senate without an 
official recommendation or even a recorded vote tally regarding the 
nomination.
71
 Neither the Committee nor the Senate as a whole spent 
long investigating and debating the merits of the nominee—in the vast 
majority of cases, the Senate’s final action occurred within a week after 
receiving the nomination from the President.
72
 All of the proceedings, in 
both the Judiciary Committee and on the Senate floor, routinely 
occurred in a closed executive session, shielded from public view.
73
 This 
secrecy extended to voting, as Senators usually voted, particularly if 
confirmation appeared likely, through an unrecorded voice vote rather 
than a roll call vote.
74
 This process did not allow for much public input, especially 
considering communication channels were much slower than today. But 
soliciting the general public’s opinion was not a concern of Senators at 
the time. Because Senators were selected by the legislatures of their 
state rather than through popular elections, they had little connection 
to the state polity.
75
 Only a select few citizens with political or financial 
clout and close connections to Senators could hope to have any impact 
on the confirmation process; the general public could only read press 
accounts and write correspondence destined to be ignored.
76
 The important influences on antebellum Senators were the political 
institutions that controlled their reelection and advancement 
opportunities—their state’s legislature and their political party. 
Senators frequently received voting advice or instructions from both 
the Senate’s closed sessions that prevented full press coverage). 
 70. DENISSTEVENRUTKUS,CONG.RESEARCHSERV.,RL31989,SUPREMECOURTAPPOINTMENT 
PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 17 (2010).
 71. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 8. 
 72. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 5. 
 73. Id. at 20. The Senate has always considered itself to be in “executive session” when 
undertaking its constitutional “advice and consent” duties on nominations made and treaties 
negotiated by the executive, the President of the United States. RICHARD S. BETH & BETSY
PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33247, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: SENATE FLOOR
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, 1789-2009 3 (2009). There is even a separately kept official record 
of the Senate for procedural actions taken related to executive business, the Executive 
Journals of the Senate. See id. at 2. Until 1929, all executive sessions of the Senate were closed 
to the public unless ordered open by a majority vote of the Senate. See infra Part II.C. 
 74. BETH & PALMER, supra note 73, at 5; RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 11. 
 75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 76. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 212-13. While it was not uncommon for prominent local 
citizens to petition the President to nominate a particular individual, such campaigns usually 
were unsuccessful. William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial 
Selection Process, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1990). The press remained the primary conduit of 
information for most citizens, although reporting at the time was highly partisan, as 
newspapers were frequently aligned with one of the major political parties. See id.
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sources.
77
 Disregarding either could potentially have severe 
repercussions on their future political careers. Not surprisingly, then, 
the types of issues Senators considered controlling in the confirmation 
process for Supreme Court nominees mirrored the then-prevailing 
concerns of state legislators and political parties regarding such 
appointments—specifically federal/state relations, national party 
politics, and political rivalries. 
 In fact, all the failed Supreme Court nominations before the Civil 
War can at least partially be attributed to one or more of these 
concerns. The Senate first rejected a Supreme Court nominee in 1795, 
when President George Washington nominated John Rutledge to 
replace Chief Justice John Jay.
78
 Senators from Rutledge’s own political 
party defeated his confirmation primarily due to Rutledge’s vigorous 
public criticism of the Jay Treaty (which had been negotiated by his 
predecessor and enthusiastically ratified by the same Federalist 
Senators considering his nomination).
79
 President James Madison’s 
nomination of Alexander Wolcott was likewise rebuffed in part due to 
the Senate’s objections to his robust partisan enforcement of the 
Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts as a United States custom 
inspector.
80
 President James Polk’s nomination of fellow Democrat 
George W. Woodward was blocked by a group of Democratic Senators, 
including Senator Cameron from Woodward’s home state, who were 
opposed to Woodward’s “gross nativist American sentiments” that 
contravened their efforts to position the party as favorable to 
immigrants.
81
 Thus, the Senate’s rejection of several antebellum 
nominees can be described as political reprisals against the candidate 
for crossing party lines or otherwise drawing the ire of Senators. 
 77. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 66. 
 78.  Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1202, 1202 (1988).
 79. Id. Rutledge had aligned himself with the opposition party by referring to the treaty 
negotiated by his fellow Federalists as a “puerile production” containing the “grossest 
absurdities.” SOUTH CAROLINA STATE-GAZETTE, July 17, 1795, in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 at 766 (Maeva Marcus & 
James R. Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. Based on these and similar 
remarks, some Federalists even questioned his mental stability, with Alexander Hamilton 
arguing he was “deranged.” See David J. Danelski, Ideology as a Ground for the Rejection of the 
Bork Nomination, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 900, 903 (1990); see also Correspondence from Secretary of 
State Edmund Randolph to President George Washington Dated July 29, 1795, in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 773. 
 80. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 32, 71; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 163. Senators also 
raised questions regarding his legal qualifications and ethics. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 32; 
MALTESE, supra note 69, at 34. 
 81. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 32; MALTESE, supra note 69, at 35; Keith E. Whittington, 
Presidents, Senates and Failed Supreme Court Nominations, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 401, 430 
(2006). Not only did Woodward’s and Cameron’s home state of Pennsylvania have a large 
ethnic population, but Woodward had also campaigned against Cameron for the Senate. 
MALTESE, supra note 69, at 35. 
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 Many other nominees were rejected as a result of political opposition 
to a nominating President, especially one that was soon departing the 
White House. The nominations of John Crittenden by John Quincy 
Adams, of George Badger, Edward Bradford, and William Micou by 
Millard Fillmore, and of Jeremiah Black by James Buchanan were all 
unsuccessful because the Senate wanted to preserve the vacancies for 
the next President.
82
 President John Tyler, who had alienated both 
political parties, had the roughest experience, nominating four men to 
the Supreme Court who were not confirmed due to the Senate’s 
(ultimately correct) belief that he would not be reelected and concerns 
that at least one of the nominees was an ardent supporter of 
state’s rights.
83
 Thus, the fact that the confirming Senators were beholden to 
political parties and state legislatures, not the public at large, lurked 
beneath the surface in all the early rejected judicial nominations. The 
importance of political parties and the federal/state dynamic was at an 
apogee before the Civil War, and these influences left their mark on the 
procedures employed during, and the final outcomes of, Senate 
consideration of Supreme Court nominees. Although certainly Senators 
were also concerned in rare instances that a nominee did not have the 
intellectual or ethical capacity for service on the High Court, a 
nominee’s lack of prior judicial or appellate experience was not viewed 
as disqualifying.
84
 In fact, some of the rejected nominees had impeccable 
prior legal and judicial experience (including one with the rare 
credential at the time of prior experience in the relatively minuscule 
ranks of the federal judiciary).
85
 And the backgrounds of the successful 
nominees further confirm the irrelevancy of prior judicial experience 
during this period. Thirty-one of the first thirty-four appointed Supreme 
Court Justices had no prior federal judicial experience, with their 
previous state judicial experience varying widely, as approximately one-
 82. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 31; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 58. 
 83. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 56-57. President Tyler has been described as the 
President without a party as he had left the Democrats to become the running mate of Whig 
Henry Harrison, but then he opposed many key Whig initiatives after succeeding to the 
presidency on Harrison’s death. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 85-86.
 84. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 32 (relating that President Madison’s nominee 
Alexander Wolcott was rejected in part due to Senators’ views that he possessed questionable 
morals and lacked legal acumen, in addition to his objectionable extremely partisan behavior).  
 85. Id. at 58-59, 85-87, 92 (describing the prior state judicial experience of several rejected 
nominees, including John Rutledge, Edward King, George W. Woodward, and Jeremiah S. 
Black). Rutledge even had prior federal judicial experience, having previously been appointed 
to the Supreme Court by President Washington in 1789 before resigning in 1791 to become 
chief justice of South Carolina. In the years before 1789, he chaired the South Carolina 
delegation to the First Continental Congress, served as president of the South Carolina 
Republic and governor of South Carolina, presided as chief judge of the South Carolina Court 
of Chancery, and attended the Constitutional Convention where he chaired the Committee of 
Detail. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 26; Monaghan, supra note 78, at 1202; Whittington, supra
note 81, at 428. 
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third had none, almost half had between one-half and six years, and the 
remainder had extensive years of service on the state bench.
86
 The only 
institutional norm that had developed in the antebellum years was 
Justices had to be distinguished or well-connected lawyers who were 
not on the wrong side of national party politics.  
B. The Postbellum Era Into the Twentieth Century 
 After the Civil War, the Senate slightly formalized its “[a]dvice and 
[c]onsent” procedures, adopting a rule in 1868 that all presidential 
nominations “shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, be referred 
to appropriate committees . . . .”
87
 This shifted the default procedure 
from a requirement that a motion be made to refer the nomination to 
the Judiciary Committee to a presumption that the referral would be 
made in the absence of an order to the contrary. As a result, since 1868 
almost all Supreme Court nominations have been referred to the 
Committee, with the exception of a few bypasses for current or former 
Senators or other individuals well-known to the Senate.
88
 Almost 
contemporaneously, the Judiciary Committee began its still-continuing 
practice of including within its reports explicit recommendations on the 
nominee’s confirmation.
89
 86. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 42-44 (Table 2). Justices Trimble, Barbour, and Daniel 
were the only members of the Court with prior federal judicial experience at the time of their 
nomination. Id. at 42. Nominees with prior federal judicial experience were rare in part 
because the federal judiciary as a whole was only a fraction of its size today, greatly limiting 
the available pool of candidates.
 87. FLOYD M. RIDDICK, HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION–
UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 96-27, at 26 (1980). 
 88. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 17-18. Only seven (of ninety-six) Supreme Court nominations 
since 1868 have not been referred to the Judiciary Committee—former Secretary of War Edwin 
M. Stanton in 1869, Senator Edward D. White in 1894 and his nomination again in 1910 for 
the position of Chief Justice, former United States Representative and Attorney General 
Joseph M. McKenna in 1897, former President William Howard Taft in 1921, former Senator 
George Sutherland in 1922, and Senator James F. Byrnes in 1941. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra
note 66, at 5-6 n.12-13. Sometimes Senators or commentators attribute these instances in 
which a nomination was not referred to the Committee as evincing a tradition or “unbroken 
custom” of senatorial courtesy to current or former colleagues. See, e.g., Nomination of Senator 
Byrnes To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 87 CONG. REC. 5062 (1941). However, on 
several other occasions, the Senate followed its standard practice and referred presidential 
nominations of current and former Senators to the Judiciary Committee, as in the 1887 
nomination of former Senator and Secretary of the Interior Lucius Lamar, the 1893 nomination of 
former Senator and Judge Howell E. Jackson, the 1937 nomination of Senator Hugo Black, the 
1945 nomination of Senator Harald H. Burton, and the 1949 nomination of former Senator and 
Judge Sherman Minton. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 17-18; RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, 
at 27, 28, 33, 34 (Table 1). These examples illustrate that, in actual practice, the Senate does 
not have an “unbroken custom” or “tradition” regarding whether its colleagues should be 
referred to the Judiciary Committee when nominated for the Supreme Court–instead, the 
decision has historically been made on a case-by-case basis. In the event a President 
nominates a Senator to the Court in the foreseeable future, the public presumably would not 
accept a decades-old, intermittently followed relic of senatorial favoritism as a sufficient 
justification for pretermitting the standard scrutiny of judicial nominees. Cf. infra Part III. 
 89. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 9. The Committee usually makes a favorable or 
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 Despite these new practices, though, the Judiciary Committee’s 
procedures were much different during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century than in modern times. The Committee did not hold public 
hearings, but instead considered nominations in secretive, closed-door 
sessions.
90
 As the New York Times reported in 1881, the “Judiciary 
Committee of the Senate is the most mysterious committee in that 
body, and succeeds better than any other in maintaining secrecy as to 
its proceedings.”
91
 The nominee did not testify;
92
 in fact, with apparently 
only one exception, no one outside the Senate participated in the 
executive sessions considering judicial confirmations.
93
 The whole affair 
was typically cursory. In the vast majority of cases, the Committee 
concluded its review less than a week after the Senate received the 
nomination.
94
 Upon receiving the committee’s recommendation, the 
Senate typically took final action within a matter of days, frequently 
with an unrecorded voice vote, unless the nomination had generated 
internal controversy.
95
 The entire confirmation process remained 
shielded, at least for the most part, from public influences. 
 This secrecy was by design. Senators were still being selected by 
state legislatures rather than directly by the polity, so public perception 
was rarely a motivating consideration for either the procedures or 
outcomes of Supreme Court confirmations.
96
 Senators were beholden to 
their party and their state legislatures, and the underlying concerns of 
those institutions predominantly drove the process. Thus, despite the 
fact that almost all nominations were referred to the Judiciary 
Committee for reporting, the mechanics—as well as the results—of the 
confirmation process had not changed appreciably. 
unfavorable recommendation, but has, on four occasions, reported the nomination while 
explicitly declining to make a recommendation. Id.
 90. Law, supra note 68, at 491; Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: 
Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 623 (2005). 
 91. The Electoral Count, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1881. 
 92. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 93-97. On rare occasions, however, nominees would 
communicate with the Senate Judiciary Committee in writing. See id. at 95-97. 
 93. See id. at 88. In 1873, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted closed hearings 
involving subpoenaed documents and outside witness testimony to consider President Grant’s 
nominee George Williams. Id. This was only done, however, after the Senate had recommitted 
his nomination to the Committee to investigate controversies regarding his use of public funds 
that arose after his nomination reached the Senate floor. Id. at 94; RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra
note 66, at 6 n.14. Other than this one instance, the only voices heard in the Committee before 
the twentieth century apparently belonged to other Senators. 
 94. See RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 25-30 (Table 1) (listing elapsed days from 
each nomination’s receipt in the Senate to the final vote of the Judiciary Committee). 
 95. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 5. Although roll call votes did become more common in the 
postbellum period than in earlier years, the Senate still decided the fate of the majority of 
nominations through unrecorded voice votes. BETH & PALMER, supra note 73, at 8.
 96. Cf. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 36-44 (describing the singular confirmation fight 
before the twentieth century where public perception influenced Senators, when the Grange 
mounted a strong, yet ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to block the confirmation of Stanley 
Matthews to the Supreme Court in 1881 as a result of his close ties to the railroad industry). 
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 The same dispositive factors underlying unsuccessful Supreme Court 
nominations in the antebellum era accordingly explain almost all the 
defeated nominations in the immediate postbellum era. For example, 
the post-Civil War Senate refused to allow its political nemesis, 
President Andrew Johnson, any appointment, going so far as to abolish 
seats on the Supreme Court to prevent nominations.
97
 President 
Ulysses Grant’s nomination of the undoubtedly qualified Ebenezer R. 
Hoar was defeated because Hoar had antagonized his fellow 
Republicans in the Senate by both his opposition to the impeachment of 
Andrew Johnson and his interference with their control over political 
spoils appointments to governmental offices.
98
 President Grant’s 
nominee and close personal friend Caleb Cushing was rejected because 
of his wishy-washy political commitments, having morphed in his career 
from a Whig to a Democrat to a Johnson supporter to a Republican.
99
And finally, during President Grover Cleveland’s second term, he was 
thwarted in two attempts to nominate a New Yorker to fill the seat 
vacated by the death of New York Justice Samuel Blatchford because 
New York Senator David B. Hill invoked senatorial courtesy,
100
 hoping 
to secure the seat for one of his own preferred candidates.
101
 Once again, 
national party politics and political affronts appear to explain the 
rejected nominees in the first few decades after the Civil War. 
 This is not to say that a nominee’s personal characteristics and 
qualities, including legal abilities and ethical principles, were not 
important to the Senate. The Senate refused to act on another of 
President Grant’s nominees, Attorney General George H. Williams, 
primarily because of Williams’ mediocre (at best) legal talents, including 
 97. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 31, 99. 
 98. Id. at 32; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 163. As Attorney General, Hoar had 
championed civil service reform for governmental offices, contravening the will of Senators 
who preferred to reward patrons with these positions. Whittington, supra note 81, at 431. In 
addition, President Grant acted on Hoar’s unilateral recommendations in filling a number of 
new federal circuit court judicial positions, disregarding the preferences of Senators, who 
believed they had a right to be consulted. MOORFIELD STOREY & EDWARD W. EMERSON,
EBENEZER ROCKWOOD HOAR: A MEMOIR 182 (1911). These perceived affronts to Senators, 
combined with Hoar’s brusque manner, badly alienated many even within his own party, 
which led to his defeat. See id.
 99. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 35; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 163. 
 100. “Senatorial courtesy” is a term describing the deference owed to Senators in the 
appointments process. Although there are various forms of senatorial courtesy, Senator Hill 
was relying on the senatorial expectation that Presidents will consult and heed the advice of a 
Senator before nominating an individual from a Senator’s home state. Cf. GERHARDT, supra
note 1, at 143-44. 
 101. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 114-15; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 64, 138. Senator Hill 
was a rival of President Cleveland within the Democratic Party, and, rather than supporting 
Cleveland loyalist nominees William B. Hornblower and Wheeler H. Peckham, he wanted to 
reward one of his own supporters with the seat. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 114-15. President 
Cleveland eventually circumvented Senator Hill’s opposition by nominating the majority 
leader of the Senate, Louisiana Senator Edward D. White, for the position. GERHARDT, supra
note 1, at 64-65. 
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his underwhelming performance as Attorney General.
102
 Nevertheless, 
no specified legal experiences were viewed as a prerequisite to service 
on the Court during this period. Indeed, just as in the antebellum era, 
some of the rejected nominees had impeccable past legal experience, 
including judicial service.
103
 On the other hand, the legal backgrounds of 
the confirmed nominees (just as in the antebellum era) varied widely, 
with some having prior federal judicial experience, others having served 
as state judges, and the rest without any prior time on the bench.
104
 The successful nominees did share two essential characteristics: (1) 
their legal talents had come to the attention of the right people, and (2) 
they were on the right side of party politics. Those were the defining 
requirements of confirmation throughout the nineteenth century, and 
indeed all that the Senate’s procedures were designed to unearth. 
C. The Twentieth Century Transformation 
 After Senators became subject to popular elections in the twentieth 
century, their increased public accountability modified the institutional 
forces affecting the appointment process, eventually culminating in a 
markedly different Senate confirmation practice. The Seventeenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in 1913, 
established that the people, rather than the legislators, of a state would 
choose their Senators.
105
 As a result, Senators’ job performances—–
including their role in the appointment process—became subject to 
public scrutiny through the ballot box.
106
 The party machinery and state 
legislators were no longer their direct supervisors—instead, the voters 
were. Not surprisingly, the influence of constituents and interest groups 
on Senators waxed while party allegiance waned.
107
 Senators eventually realized that conducting the Senate’s business 
in the public eye was necessary when elections were decided by the 
polity.
108
 Although the Senate inched quite cautiously towards opening 
its previously closed proceedings on presidential nominations, each 
crack in the doorway led to additional efforts to influence the process. In 
the end, the dynamics for Supreme Court confirmation had been 
 102. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 35. 
 103. See id. at 31-32, 99, & 114-15. 
 104. See id. at 42-43 (Table 2). 
 105. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 106. Cf. Robin M. Wolpert & James G. Gimpel, Information, Recall, and Accountability: 
The Electorate’s Response to the Clarence Thomas Nomination, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 535, 542 
(1997) (concluding a Senator’s disregard of constituent opinion on Supreme Court nominees 
may impact his or her subsequent reelection chances). 
 107. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 59. A recent study found a direct relationship between a 
Senator’s confirmation vote and constituent opinion on the nominee. Jonathan P. Kastellec et 
al., Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 72 J. POL. 767, 
769 (2010).
 108. Whittington, supra note 81, at 434. 
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reshaped: what had been a battle primarily between a Senate concerned 
with party politics and the President became a strategic interplay 
between the President, the Senate, the public at large, hundreds of 
interest groups, and the media. The Seventeenth Amendment 
fundamentally altered what Professor Michael Gerhardt has called the 
“institutional dynamics” governing the confirmation process.
109
 The ongoing development of these new institutional dynamics 
corresponded with the additional layers of public scrutiny employed in 
the Senate’s confirmation process. These layers, though, were not added 
in a linear progression, but developed tentatively over time, with some 
backtracking. The Senate first opened its proceedings to public scrutiny 
in cases involving controversial candidates, or those objectionable to 
powerful institutional actors. In these cases—and these cases only—
Senate consideration included open, public hearings before a 
subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, testimony from the 
nominee or special interest groups, or public debates on the nomination 
on the Senate floor. Over a period of several decades, as the Supreme 
Court’s decisions increasingly aroused public opinion, such procedures, 
which were initially performed on an ad hoc basis in exceptional cases, 
became the norm for addressing all Supreme Court nominations. 
 The first step occurred in 1916, when a Judiciary Committee 
subcommittee held the first ever public hearing on a Supreme Court 
appointment to consider President Woodrow Wilson’s nominee Louis 
Brandeis.
110
 The nomination of Brandeis, the first Jewish member of the 
Court, was extremely controversial, predominantly because of anti-
Semitism, but also because conservative financial and political interests 
feared that Brandeis, who had been an active legal crusader for labor 
interests, was a radical progressive.
111
 Brandeis supporters successfully 
pushed for his hearings to be held in the public view, believing that 
such scrutiny would limit the opportunity for anonymous character 
slanders and back-room comprises to derail his confirmation.
112
 Still, the 
confirmation battle was, as expected, ugly. Despite some of the 
unsubstantiated charges leveled against him, Brandeis did not 
personally testify at the hearing.
113
 A number of other individuals, 
though, were summoned to testify for and against him in the public 
 109. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 110. Law, supra note 68, at 491; Resnik, supra note 90, at 623. 
 111. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 142-143. Brandeis had been an active advocate on behalf of 
labor and the downtrodden through his law practice, his writings, his congressional testimony, 
and his counsel to prominent progressive politicians, horrifying corporate interests with his 
support of maximum work weeks and minimum wages for workers, competition between 
businesses, and a graduated income tax. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 49-50. 
 112. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 322. 
 113. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 154. Although Brandeis did not testify, he did meet 
informally with some Senators outside the hearing process and communicated with witnesses 
appearing on his behalf. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS 468, 476-77, 491-92, 
503-04 (1946).
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proceedings, including individuals sympathetic to opposing interests, 
such as the consumer and labor supporters who were instrumental in 
his eventual confirmation, and the business interests that 
unsuccessfully opposed him.
114
 But the Brandeis hearings did not establish a binding precedent in 
favor of public hearings for subsequent Senate confirmations. In 
evaluating the next six Supreme Court nominations, the Senate 
reverted to its traditional nineteenth century practices—closed sessions 
for all parts of the confirmation process and an expedient final 
disposition of the nomination.
115
  The next key step towards the modern confirmation process occurred 
in 1925, when the Senate considered President Calvin Coolidge’s 
nomination of Harlan Fiske Stone. Although Stone’s distinguished 
career included acclaimed service as a professor and dean at Columbia 
Law School and as the Attorney General who cleaned house after the 
Teapot Dome scandal, his nomination was opposed when it reached the 
Senate floor by a powerful Senator and his allies who were upset that 
Stone had continued an investigation of the Senator while he was 
Attorney General.
116
 His nomination was therefore recommitted to the 
Judiciary Committee, which arranged public hearings on a judicial 
nomination for only the second time.
117
 At the urging of President 
Calvin Coolidge, Stone requested and was allowed to testify in front of 
the subcommittee, the first nominee to do so.
118
 His frank and 
distinguished testimony regarding his actions as Attorney General 
assisted his cause, and the Judiciary Committee recommended 
confirmation.
119
 The nomination returned to the full Senate, where the 
Senate waived its long-standing rule requiring closed sessions for 
executive business and openly debated his nomination before 
confirming him overwhelmingly.
120
 114. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 69-70. The Committee summoned witnesses who could 
discuss Brandeis’ previous conduct as an attorney rather than seeking testimony from 
representatives of organized interest groups. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 51. Due to the nature 
of Brandeis’ private legal practice, however, these witnesses usually were affiliated with, or at 
least sympathetic to, the interests either of big business or of labor. See Ross, supra note 76, at 
7-9 (detailing affiliations of testifying witnesses during the Brandeis hearings). 
 115. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 31-32 (Table 1). Indeed, the Senate confirmed 
two Supreme Court nominees during this period with exceptional speed, confirming William 
Howard Taft as Chief Justice in 1921 on the same day his nomination reached the Senate and 
confirming George Sutherland as an Associate Justice in 1922 on the very same day he was 
nominated. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 146-48. 
 116. Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward A Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal 
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 491 (1998). 
 117. Law, supra note 68, at 491; Resnik, supra note 90, at 623. 
 118. Law, supra note 68, at 491-92. 
 119. Gerhardt, supra note 116, at 491. 
 120. 66 CONG. REC. 3050 (1925). The Senate confirmed the nomination in a 71-6 vote.
Id. at 3057. 
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 After Justice Stone’s appointment and before the next Supreme 
Court nomination, the Senate amended its standing rules to provide 
that its sessions on executive nominations and treaties would be open to 
the public unless ordered closed by a majority vote.
121
 Several factors 
triggered this reversal of long-standing Senate tradition. A number of 
Senators had been seeking such a change for some time, wanting the 
public (who were now their electors) to have greater awareness of 
senatorial affairs.
122
 The needed catalyst to spur the change occurred 
when national media outlets disclosed the secret vote tallies from 
Senate roll call votes on two nominations considered in executive 
session in 1929.
123
 Despite speculation that Senators in favor of opening 
Senate proceedings engineered the leak to assist their cause, the precise 
source of the report was not discovered during the public hearings that 
followed.
124
 But the whole affair had its intended purpose—the Senate 
realized that it was futile to maintain its traditional veil of secrecy on 
executive business against rebellious Senators and mounting public 
political pressure. 
 With an open confirmation process, the public, for the first time, 
could actively monitor the Senate’s role in Supreme Court 
appointments. Although this did not yet always translate into public 
involvement in the confirmation decision, the public now had the 
opportunity within the process to have their voices heard. Indeed, within 
a year of this change, for the first time in American history, public 
interest groups successfully thwarted a Supreme Court 
nominee’s confirmation.
125
 121. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule 31, S. Doc. No. 110-9, at 43 (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_documents&docid=
f:sd009b.110.
 122. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 67. 
 123. JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 249-255 (1953). The two 
nominations were for Roy O. West to become Secretary of the Interior and for Irvine Lenroot to 
serve on the Customs Court of Appeals. See id.
 124. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 67. 
 125. HARRIS, supra note 123, at 127-32. Interest groups had been involved in confirmation 
fights as far back as fifty years earlier, when the National Grange and other farm groups 
mounted a strong, yet ultimately unsuccessful, campaign against the nomination of Stanley 
Matthews to the Supreme Court. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 34 (1997); 
MALTESE, supra note 69, at 36-43. The Grange was concerned that Matthews, whose career as 
both an attorney and Senator primarily involved representing the interests of railroads, would 
invalidate both recently enacted federal legislation requiring the railroads to pay interest on 
federally issued bonds and state laws regulating railroad rates on farm products. MALTESE,
supra note 69, at 38-39. Although the first Matthews nomination by lame duck President 
Rutherford Hayes died in the Judiciary Committee at the end of the Senate session, 
Matthews was immediately renominated by incoming President Chester Garfield. Id. at 41-42. 
The newly composed Senate confirmed Matthews by a single vote, overriding the adverse 
recommendation from the Judiciary Committee and the continued objections of the Grange, 
which had protested in a correspondence campaign that his career representing railroad 
interests disqualified him from sitting on the nation’s High Court. Id. at 42-43. 
 Labor groups were intermittently involved in a handful of nominations in the early 
twentieth century, primarily through correspondence directed to the President or to Senators. 
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 The separate lobbying efforts of the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) were instrumental in defeating Republican President 
Herbert Hoover’s 1930 nomination of Judge John J. Parker to the 
Supreme Court.
126
 The AFL complained that Judge Parker was 
“unfriendly” to labor based on a case in which he upheld a yellow dog 
contract, and the NAACP pointed to remarks he made while 
campaigning for governor in 1920 that black participation in politics 
was “a source of evil and danger.”
127
 Both the AFL and NAACP 
requested and were granted the opportunity to testify before the 
subcommittee investigating Judge Parker—the first time organized 
advocacy groups had representatives testify before Senators considering 
a Supreme Court nominee.
128
 In addition, telegrams from both labor and 
civil rights organizations across the country flooded into Senate offices, 
urging that Parker should not be confirmed.
129
 These efforts had their 
intended impact, causing just enough Republican Senators to defy their 
party and vote against Parker after realizing they could not support his 
nomination without alienating vital, organized constituencies.
130
 After Judge Parker’s defeat, not only did interest groups know their 
participation could make a difference, but Senators recognized the 
See id. at 47-49. But as a result of the closed Senate confirmation procedures before 1916, 
these efforts had minimal impact. The first truly modern confirmation battle, involving 
interest groups on both sides and testifying witnesses before the Judiciary Committee, did not 
occur until the Brandeis nomination in 1916. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text. 
Labor interests won that battle when Brandeis was confirmed, and they were victorious again 
when Judge Parker’s nomination was defeated in 1930. See infra notes 126-130 and 
accompanying text. 
 126. HARRIS, supra note 123, at 127-32; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 70. 
 127. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 32-33. The focal point of labor’s objections was his opinion 
in International Organization, United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & 
Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927), which upheld a permanent injunction in favor of Red 
Jacket preventing any efforts to unionize its workforce after a violent conflict erupted in the 
area between union and corporate interests. Although Red Jacket was consistent with binding 
Supreme Court precedent, labor nonetheless objected that its tone indicated Judge Parker 
agreed with the anti-labor decisions of the Supreme Court. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 58-59. 
The NAACP was even more offended by Judge Parker’s campaign statements during his run 
for governor, in which he tried to distance himself from Democratic charges that he supported 
equal political power for black voters. See id. at 59. 
 128. Confirmation of Hon. John J. Parker to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 71st 
Cong. 24-43, 74-78 (1930). 
 129. Ross, supra note 76, at 11-12 (detailing that the subcommittee received more than one 
thousand letters opposing Parker’s confirmation from interested organizations and private 
citizens and that some individual Senators received dozens of letters and hundreds 
of telegrams). 
 130. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 58-63. At the time, African American voters still largely 
voted for the party of Lincoln, and some Republican Senators, especially from the Midwest, 
also were sympathetic to labor interests. The combination of both these separate 
constituencies was just enough to prevent his appointment, as seventeen Republicans joined 
twenty-four Democrats to defeat Parker’s confirmation by a forty-one to thirty-nine vote. See
id. at 58-69.
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continued need for public input in confirmation proceedings. In 
furtherance of this recognition, the predominant purpose of the early 
public hearings held before Judiciary Committee subcommittees was to 
provide a communications avenue for those desiring to raise objections 
against the nominee.
131
 The extent of public opposition to the nominee 
therefore actuated the process. If the nominee had little opposition, as 
frequently occurred, the hearings consisted solely of the testimony of a 
handful of adverse witnesses; these hearings sometimes concluded in a 
matter of minutes.
132
 Other times, a hearing was not held at all, either 
because no public witnesses sought to present their views or Senators 
concluded that public input was immaterial to the decision.
133
 Every 
once in a while, however, interest groups and other public witnesses 
became actively involved, stretching the hearings over several days.
134
Although such participation by interest groups only rarely occurred 
before 1949, the key was the opportunity now existed.
135
 Eventually, 
this opportunity became a standard part of the confirmation process—
since 1949, all individuals nominated to the Supreme Court have faced 
public scrutiny during an open hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee prior to their confirmation vote.
136
 Shortly after 1949, another practice became accepted that has 
likewise increased the public scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees—the 
nominees’ testimony in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Although Harlan Stone testified before a subcommittee in 1925, it took 
another three decades before this became a standard practice.
137
 During 
the 1930s and 1940s, nominees intermittently appeared to publicly 
testify before the subcommittee, but typically only if Senators had 
specific concerns related to the nominee’s character or ethics that had 
been raised by testifying witnesses or other Senators.
138
 But the 
 131. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 20. 
 132. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 7 n.18. 
 133. Id. at 32-34. One out of every three nominees between 1925 and 1949 did not receive a 
hearing. See id. at 32-34 (table indicating that no hearing was held for five of the fifteen 
nominations between 1930 and 1946—Charles Evan Hughes, Owen J. Roberts, Hugo Black, 
James F. Byrnes [who was not referred to the Committee], and Harold H. Burton). Three of 
these five nominees were current or former Senators, and one had previously served as an 
Associate Justice on the Supreme Court. 
 134. See, e.g., MALTESE, supra note 69, at 104-07 (describing the confirmation hearings for 
Felix Frankfurter in 1939, which extended over three days and consisted of testimony of the 
nominee, representatives of three organized interest groups, and other assorted witnesses). 
 135. Id. at 89-91 (highlighting that representatives from organized interest groups only 
testified in two public hearings of thirteen nominations between 1930 and 1949). 
 136. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 7 (noting that all the individuals nominated for 
the Supreme Court since 1949 have had a Committee hearing except for Harriet Miers, whose 
nomination was withdrawn before hearings could be held). 
 137. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 19. Even as late as 1949, Sherman Minton refused to 
testify before the committee, asserting that his record as a Senator and federal appellate court 
judge spoke “for itself.” Id. at 21. The Committee eventually agreed, because he was 
confirmed. Id.
 138. See id. at 20. For example, Felix Frankfurter testified in 1939, primarily responding 
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Judiciary Committee’s examination practices changed shortly after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
139
Brown, of course, was a watershed decision and a pivotal moment in 
the American constitutional tradition. Although its basic mandate that 
racial segregation in education cannot be equal within the meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause is well accepted today, many in the Deep 
South unfortunately resisted this revolutionary change to their 
historical practices.
140
 This resistance extended to certain segregationist 
Senators from southern states, who pressed nominees for the Supreme 
Court soon after the issuance of Brown to appear before the Judiciary 
Committee and discuss their views on desegregation and other issues.
141
These appearances began the still-continuing practice of attempting to 
ascertain a nominee’s approaches to—and views on—legal issues 
through pointed Committee examination. In years since, all Supreme 
Court nominees have appeared before the Committee to answer 
questions related to their judicial philosophy, the role of precedent, and 
even their opinions regarding specific cases.
142
 Yet the duration and the specificity of the questioning of the nominee 
have intensified over time. Between 1955 and 1967, a nominee’s 
testimony—while a routine part of the proceedings—typically lasted for 
to charges raised by witnesses against him regarding his ties to and activities for the 
Communist Party (none) and the American Civil Liberties Union (where he was an active 
member of its national committee), although the questions also addressed other matters as 
well. See id. Similarly, Robert H. Jackson was called to testify in 1941 to defend his decision as 
Attorney General to refrain from prosecuting two journalists for allegedly defaming a Senator. 
Id. at 20-21. But the questioning of the nominee was the exception, not the rule, in the thirties 
and forties, only occurring when Senators believed the nominee needed to respond to a 
particular matter. Just two months after Frankfurter’s testimony, for instance, William O. 
Douglas waited outside the hearing room to testify, but was informed that no one had any 
questions for him. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 177. And in 1930, the Committee rejected a 
motion to have Judge Parker testify in person. WILLIAM C. BURRIS, DUTY AND THE LAW: JUDGE
JOHN J. PARKER AND THE CONSTITUTION 84-85 (1987). 
 139. 347 U.S 483 (1954). 
 140. See, e.g., THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 67-91 (1969). 
 141. Gerhardt, supra note 116, at 471. The first nominee after Brown, John Marshall 
Harlan (II), evaded answering questions about Brown, but Senators became more insistent in 
their questioning about Brown in subsequent nominations, especially during Potter Stewart’s 
1958 confirmation hearing. See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial 
Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1069 (2008) (book review). During Harlan’s hearing, he 
predominantly responded to Senators’ questions about national sovereignty issues and the 
treaty power. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 21. 
 142. Gerhardt, supra note 116, at 471; see, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 21-28. Of 
course, a long-standing debate exists regarding the propriety of nominees answering questions 
that concern issues likely to become before the Court. Id. at 19. The uneasy compromise of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee has been that Senators are free to ask any questions, and the 
nominee is free to refrain from answering as a result of the impropriety of the question. Cf.
Nomination of Potter Stewart to Be Associate Justice of the United States, Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86 Cong. 41-44 (1958). As a practical matter, this compromise means 
that the nominee typically answers the questions only to the extent necessary to be confirmed. 
Ginsburg Marches Past Hearings on Near-Certain Path to Court, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
1956, 1958 (1993) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
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only a few hours during a day or two in front of the Committee, and 
usually was somewhat broad brushed.
143
 But as the Warren Court 
expanded protections for criminal defendants and provided additional 
legal protections to the economically and politically disadvantaged, 
politicians directed the public’s attention to the Supreme Court and its 
role in the American political process.
144
 Richard Nixon’s 1968 
presidential campaign even appeared at times to be more against the 
Warren Court than against his Democratic opponent.
145
 As nationwide 
public and political attention focused on the Supreme Court, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s confirmation role undertook additional import. 
Senators accordingly devoted more time and effort during the hearings 
to a substantive examination of nominees’ judicial philosophies and 
views on specific legal issues.
146
 The publicized campaign against the Court also increased the 
involvement of public interest organizations in the confirmation 
process. After the Parker nomination in 1930 and until 1968, a 
grand total of twenty-eight representatives of interest groups 
testified, appearing in a mere nine out of the twenty-five nominations 
considered by the Senate.
147
 But since 1968, interest groups have been 
involved in every confirmation hearing except one, usually with 
several—and in some instances dozens—of organizations testifying 
through representatives.
148
 This enhanced senatorial and interest group attention contributed to 
the onslaught of four failed Supreme Court nominations between 1968 
and 1970. The frustrations of many public interest organizations with 
the Warren Court’s decisions on criminal justice, racial relations, 
religious liberty, and voting practices helped block President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s 1968 nominations of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to become 
Chief Justice and Judge Homer Thornberry to replace Fortas as a 
 143. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 18, 22-24. 
 144. Law, supra note 68, at 519. 
 145. JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD, 313 (1991); KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 
25; see Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Activism as Judicial Responsibility: A Tale of 
Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 715 (2009). 
 146. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 24-26. 
 147. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 90 (Table 5). As discussed previously, in some of these 
instances, no hearing was held. See supra text accompanying note 133. But even if these 
nominations are not considered, organized interests testified in less than half of the hearings 
held. One interest group testified during Stanley Reed’s confirmation hearing, three during 
Felix Frankfurter’s, ten during Tom Clark’s, one during Sherman Minton’s, two during Earl 
Warren’s, seven during John Marshall Harlan’s, two during Byron White’s, and one during 
both Abe Fortas’s and Thurgood Marshall’s. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 90 (Table 5). 
 148. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 90 (table 5). The one exception was Judge Harry 
Blackmun in 1970. See id. Judge Blackmun was President Nixon’s third attempt to fill a 
vacant Supreme Court seat, with interest groups contributing to the defeat of the first two 
candidates. See infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. After two successful battles, 
interest groups apparently did not want to expend any more capital on opposing a candidate 
that, from their perspective, was relatively palatable. 
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Justice, although the President’s lame-duck status also played a role.
149
In addition, civil rights and labor groups, as they had done forty years 
earlier against Judge Parker, rallied against President Nixon’s 
nominees Judge Clement F. Haynsworth and Judge G. Harold 
Carswell,
150
 even though other factors also contributed to their defeats, 
including party politics and judicial character.
151
 While the Fortas, 
Haynsworth, and Carswell nominations were initially reported 
favorably out of the Judiciary Committee, their confirmation hopes were 
dashed as internal and external scrutiny intensified and public pressure 
mounted against their nominations.
152
 The scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees has since only escalated as 
the Court’s involvement in contentious social issues burgeoned and the 
 149. JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS 1-2, 16-20, 24-27 (1990). 
President Johnson nominated sitting Associate Justice Abe Fortas to replace Earl Warren as 
Chief Justice and federal appellate judge Homer Thornberry to fill Fortas’ position. ABRAHAM,
supra note 1, at 31. Although the Judiciary Committee, by an eleven to six vote, reported the 
Fortas nomination favorably, several committee members strongly dissented to the 
recommendation, predominantly complaining about his adherence—and contributions—to the 
judicial philosophy of the Warren Court. See Exec. Rep. 90-8, Nomination of Abe Fortas to Be 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 90 Cong. 15-44 (1968). He had been a 
reliably liberal vote in civil rights cases, frequently joining with Chief Justice Warren and 
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall to reach an instrumentalist result. The Senate 
filibustered the Fortas nomination once it reached the floor for a number of reasons, including his 
judicial philosophy, ethical concerns regarding his acceptance of a huge lecture fee, his continued 
close relationship with President Johnson, and political opposition to President Johnson during 
the last year of his presidency. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 227-28. Because the nomination of 
Fortas for Chief Justice failed, the nomination of Judge Thornberry for Associate Justice was 
withdrawn because no vacant Associate Justice positions existed. See id. at 228. 
 150. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 72; MASSARO, supra note 149, at 3-4, 21-23. In 
circumstances eerily reminiscent of the Judge Parker confirmation fight, the AFL-CIO 
complained that several of Judge Haynsworth’s labor opinions for the Fourth Circuit indicated 
an anti-labor bias, particularly seven decisions reversed by the Supreme Court. MALTESE,
supra note 69, at 72. Moreover, the NAACP and other African American leaders complained 
that his rulings were racially insensitive, pointing to three cases where he dissented from 
judgments favorable to civil rights claims and another three cases where the result he joined 
impeded educational desegregation efforts (and were later reversed by the Supreme Court). Id.
And, like what occurred to Judge Parker, labor and civil rights groups flooded the Senate with 
mail and telegrams opposing him. Ross, supra note 76, at 16-18. 
 The complaint against Judge Carswell was more obvious—while running for the Georgia 
legislature, he urged in a speech before the American Legion on August 2, 1948 that 
“segregation of the races is proper and the only practical and correct way of life” and that he 
would always be governed by a “firm, vigorous belief in the principles of white supremacy.” 
MALTESE, supra note 69, at 135. 
 151. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 33. President Nixon mismanaged both nominations by 
adopting a confrontational rather than collaborative posture with the Senate, which was 
controlled by the opposition party. MASSARO, supra note 149, at 96-104, 124-33. Ethical 
questions also dogged Judge Haynsworth regarding his failure to recuse from cases involving 
corporations in which he had made investments, and Judge Carswell’s professional 
qualifications and intellectual abilities were widely perceived as inadequate. KATZMANN, supra
note 125, at 25; MASSARO, supra note 149, at 6-7. 
 152. See KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 24-25; RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 35-36 
(Table 1). The Senate Judiciary Committee did not issue a report on Judge Thornberry because 
it was awaiting the resolution of the Fortas nomination before doing so. See id.
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spotlight of television illuminated the Senate’s hearings and debates. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s first gavel-to-gavel television 
broadcast of its hearings occurred in 1981, for the nomination of the 
Supreme Court’s first female Justice, Sandra Day O’Connor.
153
Television coverage then expanded in 1986 with broadcast coverage of 
the Committee hearings, the subsequent Senate floor debate, and 
the confirmation vote for Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist to 
become Chief Justice and Judge Antonin Scalia to become an 
Associate Justice.
154
 Due to its familiarity today, the influence of television on the process 
is easily discounted, but it should not be. The first impact is that 
broadcasted hearings tend to be much longer. A study by Professors 
Ringhand and Collins reveals that, since 1986, hearings, on average, 
have involved approximately four times the amount of commentary by 
nominees and Senators than pre-1986 hearings.
155
 Many Senators 
apparently view televised hearings as an opportunity to communicate 
their political and legal visions to their constituents and the nation at 
large (thereby bolstering their reelection hopes), which has 
substantially lengthened the duration of the hearings.
156
 A closely 
related consequence of televised proceedings is the marked increase in 
the elapsed time between the President’s announcement of the 
nomination and the commencement of public confirmation hearings on 
the nominee. Before televised hearings, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee began ninety percent (twenty-seven out of thirty) of its 
public hearings within thirty days of the presidential nomination.
157
 But 
since the proceedings have been televised, that percentage has almost 
completely flipped—televised hearings almost never begin less than 
thirty days after the nomination.
158
 Before being ready for their close-up 
 153. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 238; KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 9. Although the 
Committee typically prohibited any televised coverage of Supreme Court confirmation 
hearings before 1981, there were at least a few instances when portions of hearings were 
broadcast. See RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 21 n.79 (discussing television and newsreel coverage 
of portions of the William J. Brennan and Felix Frankfurter confirmation hearings). 
 154. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 35 n.139. Today, of course, the proceedings are typically 
broadcast on several cable and broadcast channels and on Internet web sites. 
 155. Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M. Collins, Jr., May It Please the Senate: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939-2009,
60 AM. U. L. REV. 589 598-99 (2011). 
 156. Cf., e.g., Kagan Hearing, supra note 21, 2010 WL 2600871, at *114 (statement of 
Senator Leahy) (alluding to the propensity of some Senators to give “10, 15-minute speeches” 
on strongly held personal beliefs rather than ask questions of the nominee). 
 157. See RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 31-37 (Table 1). Two of the exceptions were 
for Justices William J. Brennan and Potter Stewart, both of whom received recess 
appointments and were thus already serving on the Court, reducing the necessity for prompt 
action. See id. at 34-35. The other exception was for John Marshall Harlan, whose nomination 
commenced the modern standard practice of nominee testimony. See id.; see supra text 
accompanying notes 141-142. 
 158. See RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 37-40 (Table 1). The exceptions are as 
follows: the hearing for Justice O’Connor began twenty-one days after it was received in the 
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on a national stage, Senators apparently prefer to have a longer 
time to prepare. 
 This additional delay has, in turn, created a larger window for 
interest group mobilization and participation before the Judiciary 
Committee. Televising the proceedings only raises the stakes for such 
organizations, because it provides a means of obtaining free exposure to 
a large audience.
159
 The number of witnesses representing organized 
interests has accordingly increased dramatically since televised 
hearings began, with ten to fifteen testifying representatives being 
normal, and many more for controversial nominees.
160
 A mutually 
reinforcing relationship often develops between special interests, the 
media, and the public at large. When special interest activities are 
reported by the media, these reports generate public interest in the 
nomination.
161
 As public interest mounts, this feeds more interest group 
participation, which can lead to additional media accounts.
162
 Public 
interest groups, the media, and the public at large have thus become 
integral parts of the confirmation process. 
 The President and the Senate must now take account of the strategic 
interplay between these various forces, which has completely 
transformed a confirmation process that once was designed to be a 
matter of party politics without public involvement. These new 
dynamics have fundamentally altered the unwritten rules for obtaining 
confirmation. Although nominees were blocked with some frequency 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these rejections 
predominantly resulted from partisan national politics or sectional or 
personal rivalries. Sometimes this partisanship and rivalry 
enveloped a nominee’s stance on a political issue, such as Rutledge’s 
criticism of the Jay Treaty, Wolcott’s partisan enforcement of the 
Embargo Acts, or Hoar’s opposition to patronage and the impeachment 
of Andrew Johnson. But these were not issues that would come before 
the Court for resolution—they were instead matters of political loyalty 
and rivalry. 
 In contrast, though, the nominee’s anticipated approach to judging 
legal issues confronted by the Court was at least a factor in all the 
failed Supreme Court nominations in the twentieth century. Judge 
Senate, the hearing for Justice Kennedy (the third nominee announced by President Reagan 
for that vacancy) began fourteen days after Senate receipt, and the hearing for Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg began twenty-eight days after she was nominated. All other nominees have 
had to wait from thirty-nine to seventy days from the official announcement of their 
nominations until the beginning of their hearings. Id.
 159. Cf. Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 59, at 464-66 (detailing that modern interest 
groups since President Reagan frequently devote full-time staffs to monitoring the nomination 
and confirmation of judicial candidates). 
 160. See MALTESE, supra note 69, at 90-91 (Table 5). 
 161. Cf. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 34-35. 
 162. See id. at 35-36. 
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Parker’s decisions on labor issues and his comments on race, Justice 
Fortas’ role in Warren Court decisions objectionable to many 
conservatives, Judge Haynsworth’s appellate decisions on labor and 
desegregation, and Judge Carswell’s prior announced support of 
segregation and white supremacy all involved current judicial—and not 
merely political—issues. As public involvement in the confirmation 
process increased, and the Court’s decisions became a more vital aspect 
of American life, the nominee’s judicial philosophy became paramount. 
It no longer sufficed that the nominee was a well-connected attorney on 
the right side of party politics. The process was now designed to obtain 
at least a partial view of his or her vision of the judicial role. 
 In the midst of this transformation of the confirmation process, 
nominees with relevant prior judicial experience, particularly on federal 
appellate courts, became the norm. The trend began in earnest with 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who stated—after his disappointment 
with the direction charted for the Court by his first Supreme Court 
appointment, Chief Justice Earl Warren—he preferred a nominee with 
prior judicial service that would “provide an inkling of his 
philosophy.”
163
 Senators concurred, pressing the White House for 
nominees with prior judicial experience, arguing that decisions 
departing from historical understanding (such as Brown) would be less 
likely without as many politicians and academics on the bench.
164
 Before 
Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, only sixteen percent of the Supreme 
Court Justices in American history had previously served on the federal 
appellate courts.
165
 Since Eisenhower appointed Warren, two-thirds of 
the Justices have had prior experience on the federal appellate courts, 
and, of the remaining one-third, almost forty percent had previously 
served as a state judge or the Solicitor General.
166
 This trend for nominating sitting judges only accelerated after the 
Burger Court became enmeshed in politically divisive social issues in 
the 1970s, such as the death penalty, affirmative action, and abortion.
167
Since 1972, all but two of the successful Supreme Court appointees have 
 163. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE FOR CHANGE, 1953-
1956, at 230 (1963). 
 164. Circuit Effects, supra note 15, at 835-36.
 165. Id. at 839. 
 166. Twenty-four Justices have served on the Supreme Court after Chief Justice Earl 
Warren’s appointment, with sixteen of them having prior federal judicial experience–Justices 
Harlan, Whittaker, Stewart, Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, Alito, and Sotomayor. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 44; 
Kiely, supra note 10. Of the remaining jurists, Justices Brennan and O’Connor were state 
court judges when appointed, Justice Kagan was Solicitor General, Justice Goldberg was 
Secretary of Labor, Justices White and Rehnquist served in the Attorney General’s office, and 
Justices Fortas and Powell were well known private practitioners (and, in the case of Fortas, 
a well-known advisor to the president). See id.
 167. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative action); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty). 
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been elevated from a position on the federal appellate bench, with the 
exceptions being Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was serving on a 
state appellate bench, and Justice Elena Kagan, who was serving as 
Solicitor General.
168
 The current confirmation process thereby 
apparently favors prior appellate judicial experience, as long as the 
nominee has not been too forthright with his or her personal opinions 
prejudging the controversial issues confronted by the Court. 
D. The Modern Process 
 After decades of evolution during the twentieth century, the Senate 
confirmation process has now stabilized. Once the President nominates 
a candidate, the Senate Judiciary Committee begins reviewing the 
nominee’s background, qualifications, prior judicial opinions, and other 
writings. The nominee is also expected to complete a detailed 
Committee questionnaire, which includes questions on the nominee’s 
professional history, financial affairs, jurisprudential views, and any 
potential legal or ethical breaches.
169
 Contemporaneously with the 
Judiciary Committee’s review, the nominee visits individual Senators in 
their offices and prepares for the upcoming Committee hearing, which 
usually occurs six to nine weeks after the nomination.
170
 The televised confirmation hearing begins with each member of the 
Judiciary Committee making opening remarks; then the nominee is 
introduced to the Committee through “presenters” and allowed to make 
an opening statement.
171
 After the opening formalities, each Senator on 
the Committee has the opportunity to examine the nominee for a pre-
established length of time during two or more rounds of questioning, 
usually over three or more days.
172
 The Committee then hears testimony 
from public witnesses, including the chair of the ABA’s Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, legal scholars, other lawyers, and 
representatives of various organizations and interest groups regarding 
the nominee.
173
 Sometime during the hearing, the Committee also holds, 
as a matter of course, a closed-door session with the nominee to discuss 
any material confidential information (whether or not such information 
 168. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 169. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 22. 
 170. Id. at 22-25. This courtesy call practice apparently became the norm during Justice 
O’Connor’s confirmation in 1981, see id., even though earlier nominees had occasionally 
informally met with Senators. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS 503-04 (5th ed. 
1966) (describing a dinner meeting between Brandeis and two Senators who were wavering on 
his confirmation). Today, the nominees typically meet with the entire membership of the 
Judiciary Committee and almost every other Senator before the confirmation hearing. See, e.g.,
Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 11, at 58 (statement of Judge Sotomayor) (indicating that she 
had met with eighty-nine Senators and the entire membership of the Judiciary Committee 
before her hearing). 
 171. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 29. 
 172. Id.
 173. Id. at 31. 
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actually exists).
174
 After the hearing, the Judiciary Committee 
reconvenes and reports the nomination with either a favorable, 
unfavorable, or no recommendation to the entire Senate. 
 Assuming the nomination is not stalled either through Judiciary 
Committee or Senate inaction or through a filibuster on the Senate 
floor, Senate leaders schedule, either through motion or unanimous 
consent, a time for debate on the appointment. After debate the Senate 
then votes in a recorded roll call whether to confirm the nomination.
175
 The process, which typically stretches over two to three months, 
provides ample opportunity for scrutinizing the nominee’s record and 
obtaining public viewpoints regarding the nominee’s suitability for a 
lifetime appointment to the High Court. The glare from this extended 
public spotlight has influenced all the institutional actors involved in 
judicial appointments, including the media, special interest groups, 
Senators, the President, and nominees.
176
 These new institutional dynamics shaped the failed 1987 Supreme 
Court nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork.
177
 Judge Bork, among his 
many other qualifications, had served on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, as Solicitor General of the United 
States, and as a law professor at Yale University.
178
 However, in his 
numerous writings and speeches, Bork had castigated many aspects of 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisionmaking. His targets 
included the methodology employed to establish the right to privacy and 
particularly the right to an abortion; the constitutional foundation for 
the principle of one-person, one-vote; and the respect owed to precedent 
not based on original intent.
179
 A concerted campaign formed almost 
immediately to derail his nomination.
180
 Civil rights organizations, pro-
choice groups, and women’s rights organizations banded together to 
 174. Id. at 31-32. This has been the Judiciary Committee’s practice since 1992, after the 
public hearing regarding sexual harassment claims against Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991. 
Senator Joseph Biden explained then that the hearings would be conducted in all subsequent 
cases, “even where there are no major investigative issues to be resolved, so that the holding of 
such a hearing cannot be taken to demonstrate that the committee has received adverse 
confidential information about the nominee.” 138 CONG. REC. 16320 (1992) (statement of Sen. 
Biden). Recently, the session has occurred immediately after or in the midst of the nominee’s 
testimony, see Ralph Lindeman, U.S. Supreme Court Nominee Kagan Pledges to Support 
‘Modest’ Role for Court, 78 U.S.L.WK. 2778 (2010), although in other instances the session 
occurred after hearing from all witnesses. 
 175. RUTKUS, supra note 70, at 46. Every confirmation decision since 1967 has been 
through a recorded roll call rather than a voice vote. See id.
 176. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 67-69. 
 177. The Bork confirmation battle has been the subject of much scholarly analysis. See,
e.g., Symposium, The Bork Nomination: Essays and Reports, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1987).
 178. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 266, 281-82; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 183. 
 179. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 1-20 (1971); cf. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 183; KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 
28-29. 
 180. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 28-29. 
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voice their vehement disapproval.
181
 Bork’s opponents not merely 
bombarded the Senators with objections to his appointment, but also 
undertook an extensive media campaign, with television, radio, and 
print advertisements, as well as press briefings to influence media 
reports.
182
 The opposition also participated en masse during his 
confirmation hearings, which lasted for twelve days stretched over the 
last half of September, involving more than one hundred testifying 
witnesses.
183
 After conducting these lengthy hearings, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee reported the nomination unfavorably, and the full 
Senate concurred, rejecting him in a forty-two to fifty-eight vote.
184
 The 
Senate’s rejection of Bork’s nomination emphasized the importance in 
the modern judicial appointments process of the public’s perception 
regarding the nominee’s approach to judging.
185
 Although some contend that the public should not undertake such a 
role in the appointments process,
186
 the public’s present participation, I 
believe, serves a necessary purpose. The Supreme Court’s legitimacy 
depends, to an extent, on sociological public acceptance of its role in 
adjudging whether legislative or executive acts comply with the 
Constitution under principles of judicial review. The public’s current 
input into the process, as I argue below, aids its acceptance of the 
modern pervasiveness of the Court in American lives. 
III. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PUBLIC VISION OF THE LEGITIMATE
JUDICIAL ROLE
 The just-described history of the institutional dynamics of the 
appointments process reveals the ever-increasing involvement of the 
public and its impact on confirmation outcomes. I turn now to offering a 
theoretical justification for this state of affairs. I begin with a discussion 
of the interconnection between the judiciary and the people, illustrating 
the need for the judicial craft to be accepted at some level by the public 
for the Supreme Court to exercise authority. I then examine popular 
conceptions of the judicial role and hypothesize that public trust is 
currently enhanced by Supreme Court appointees who boast prior 
 181. MALTESE, supra note 69, at 89, 91-92. 
 182. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 35-36; MALTESE, supra note 69, at 89, 91-92; Ross, 
supra note 76, at 23-24. 
 183. See Exec. Report 100-7, Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court, 100 Cong. 2 (1989). 
 184. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 38. 
 185. See MASSARO, supra note 149, at 159, 163-68 (detailing Senators’ objections to Bork’s 
judicial philosophy); Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at 
A19 (noting that Bork’s nomination was defeated “largely because of his positions on abortion, 
civil rights and civil liberties”). Judge Bork’s position on these issues undertook additional 
importance as he was being nominated to replace Justice Lewis Powell, who frequently served 
as the Court’s centrist swing vote. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 28. 
 186. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 8-11 (1988).
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judicial or analogous experience indicating an open mind. I finally test 
this theory with recent examples of confirmed Justices, demonstrating 
the successful nominees had at least some prior track record of open-
minded decisionmaking. 
A. The Need for Public Acceptance 
 The theoretical position of judicial review within the framework of 
our constitutional democratic republic is difficult to justify.
187
 The text 
of the Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal judiciary the 
power to decide the constitutionality of the acts of coequal branches of 
the government.
188
 Without a textual basis, this power appears in 
tension with the central idea of a democracy, “that the majority has the 
ultimate power to displace the decision-makers and to reject any part of 
their policy.”
189
 Under judicial review, five (of the current nine) 
unelected Justices appointed for life by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate may negate the determination of the 
democratic, politically accountable branches regarding the 
constitutionality of either a legislative or executive act. This has been 
frequently argued to be “a counter-majoritarian force in our system” 
and “a deviant institution in the American democracy.”
190
 These complaints are not new. The Court’s first use of judicial review 
to invalidate federal legislation in Marbury v. Madison
191
 was criticized 
by many contemporaries.
192
 For decades afterwards even respected 
jurists dissented from the premise that judges could exercise such 
power.
193
 Presidents and legislators have also voiced strenuous 
objections, going so far as to ignore or refuse to follow judicial decisions.
194
 Yet the institutional role of the Supreme Court in exercising judicial 
review survives to this day. Although the extent of its intrusion into the 
affairs of other governmental departments has varied over time, the 
legal legitimacy of its articulated role has always depended to some 
extent, and continues to depend, upon sociological public acceptance of 
the practice.
195
 As Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist, the 
 187. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) (describing the “academic 
obsession” with establishing an accepted theoretical justification for judicial review). 
 188. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 189. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 27 (2d ed. 1986). 
 190. See, e.g., id. at 16, 18. 
 191. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 192. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Mrs. John Adams, Sept. 11, 1804, in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49-53 (1903).
 193. See, e.g., Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-382 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
 194. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 5, 9-10 (1897). 
 195. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A 
DEMOCRACY 209-10 (1960); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV.
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Court has “neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.”
196
 Without 
the power to command the military or to direct the public treasury, the 
Supreme Court relies on the acceptance of the other branches and the 
acquiescence of the public itself to support its decisions invalidating 
executive and legislative acts. The public must believe, or at least 
acquiesce in the belief, that the Supreme Court’s position in American 
government is appropriate for our society.
197
 Some have argued that, due to the relative lack of public 
understanding of the Supreme Court’s role and its decisions, this may 
mean “scarcely more than that the public . . . ha[d] not mounted a 
revolt.”
198
 I believe, however, that public evidence of acceptance can be 
described in more tangible terms. 
 The people have had ample opportunities to prohibit or constrain 
judicial review during the more than 200 years of its practice in 
America. But we have not done so. The clearest evidence is contained in 
state constitutions, which are closer to the majoritarian influences of 
the populace, as state charters typically have been adopted, and must 
be amended, through the majority vote of the polity.
199
 Yet judicial 
review has never been banned in any one of the approximately 150 state 
constitutions ratified during our nation’s history, even when a 
subsequent state constitution was adopted after the populace was 
cognizant of the practice.
200
L. REV. 1787, 1792 (2005). 
 196. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 197. Cf. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 77 
(expanded ed. 1981) (“Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain 
the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the 
society.”); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 7 (2006) (maintaining that the people have the “responsibility to 
judge the Court, and it is our judgment that must be decisive in the end”). 
 198. Fallon, supra note 195, at 1825. 
 199. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 25-27 (1998) (detailing that 
the people of every state except Delaware ratify all state constitutional changes).
 200. Cf. id. (enumerating the various ways in which citizens may amend the constitution of 
their state). For example, under the 1836 Republic of Texas Constitution, the Supreme Court 
of the Republic of Texas struck down several legislative acts as unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Republic of Texas Part 2 of 2: The Decisions, 8 GREEN
BAG 2D 239, 239-40, 239-40 nn.1-8 (2005) (citing cases). One opinion even offered a ringing 
endorsement of judicial review in a system of separation of powers: 
[T]he judiciary is not only a co-ordinate branch of the government, but a check 
interposed to keep the other branches . . . within the letter and spirit, the 
requisitions, the limitations and landmarks of the immutable constitutive law; 
that the exertion of this great and paramount duty is essential to the existence 
and transmission of freedom; and that this court is the last resort in which the 
rights of the people are protected, the constitution vindicated and the 
government preserved. 
Stockton v. Montgomery, Dallam 473, 480-81 (Tex. 1842). If the citizens of Texas disagreed 
with this assessment, they would presumably have prohibited or limited the power of judicial 
review in one of the five statehood constitutions ratified after this decision. But Texans—or, for 
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 It is not as if the state polity views itself as incompetent to fashion 
such a change. Constitutional provisions in a handful of states preclude 
judicial review of certain questions, such as recall,
201
 or provide 
definitive structural limitations on the use of judicial review, such as 
super-majority requirements.
202
 But no state—despite the frequent 
amendments to state constitutions that can even be accomplished by 
citizen initiatives in some states
203
—bars the judiciary from having the 
final word on the constitutionality of a statute. 
 Although citizens do not have the same direct avenues of 
constitutional reform available at the federal level, other methods exist 
to limit the influence of the judiciary. A strong enough concerted effort 
by citizens could effect constitutional change through the amendment 
process.
204
 Even without a constitutional amendment, constituents could 
pressure Congress to strip the Supreme Court of aspects of its 
jurisdiction,
205
 or to alter the Court’s size to achieve certain objectives.
206
While such statutory measures are proposed frequently, their lack of 
success over the last century evinces more than just a failure to revolt—
it indicates a general acceptance of the Supreme Court’s position in the 
American political framework. Opinion polls are in accord—the Supreme 
Court, and its institutional role in interpreting the Constitution, has the 
current support of the vast majority of Americans.
207
 But past and current acceptance does not necessarily translate into 
continued future support. The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch 
depends ultimately on public perception that it can be trusted to engage 
in impartial decisionmaking in a nonpartisan fashion, as even the 
Supreme Court itself has recognized.
208
 “We the People” therefore must 
that matter, citizens in any other state–have not done so. 
 201. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8 (stating recall of public officials “shall be a political 
rather than a judicial question”). 
 202. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (mandating that legislation shall not “be held 
unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five [of seven] judges”); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4 
(precluding the supreme court from declaring “a legislative enactment unconstitutional 
unless . . . four of the [five] members of the court so decide”). 
 203. TARR, supra note 199, at 25-27, 34-37. Although limitations exist on citizen initiative 
constitutional amendments, see id., the availability of the process is nonetheless important. 
 204. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 205. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 319-57 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing history of jurisdiction-
stripping efforts). 
 206. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995) (discussing President 
Roosevelt’s failed attempt to pack the Supreme Court with additional Justices). 
 207. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for 
the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 640 (1992) (reporting high levels of public support 
for retaining the Supreme Court and its role in judicial review); James L. Gibson et al., 
Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 358-62 
(2003) (discussing various opinion polls finding widespread support for the Court as 
interpreter of the Constitution).
 208. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (“The legitimacy of the 
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continue to accept the judiciary as the appropriate institution to declare 
the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The 
judiciary’s fitness to undertake this role requires a judicial process 
viewed by the American people as both sufficiently principled in 
application and appropriately distinct from ordinary politics.
209
 The necessity of a principled and distinct judicial process has become 
more vital during the last half century as the Court’s decisions have 
increasingly encountered aroused public opinion. If the public views 
these controversial decisions as ordinary politics masquerading through 
judicial decrees, the sociological acceptance of the Supreme Court’s 
unique role in the American governmental structure will be lost. The 
Supreme Court cannot be viewed as a super legislature, or some type of 
“revolt” may indeed be forthcoming, abolishing or curtailing judicial 
review and the Court’s institutional power. For its constitutional 
decisions on culturally divisive political issues to be respected, the 
Court must be perceived as engaging in a principled application of the 
judicial craft that differs from legislative and executive actions. The 
public’s conception of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process is 
therefore paramount. 
B. The Public View of Judges and Judging 
 Yet the difficulty is that the vast majority of the public is relatively 
ignorant regarding judicial outputs and the methods of constitutional 
interpretation employed by the courts. The uniform assessment of 
scholars is that public “salience of the output of courts is low,”
210
 with 
surveys revealing a quite minimal public awareness of Supreme Court 
decisions.
211
 Under these circumstances, how is the process of principled 
constitutional decisionmaking by the Supreme Court to be 
distinguished in the public mind from any resulting controversial 
decisions?
 The public does so today, I believe, through attention to the inputs 
into the decisionmaking process, that is, the Justices themselves. In 
other words, “We the People” ensure our check on judicial practices by 
providing popular input during the appointments process regarding the 
characteristics and qualities of an appropriate judicial nominee. Although 
Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.”). 
 209. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992). 
 210. Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 
2620 (2003).
 211. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United 
States Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime 
Changes, 2 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 357, 360-64 (1968). While a recent study concluded that the 
public’s knowledge of the Supreme Court is greater than typically supposed, the study did not 
measure the public’s “substantive knowledge about the Court’s involvement in [public policy] 
issues.” JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS:
POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 29 (2009). 
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the public may not entirely comprehend the Supreme Court’s output of 
judicial decisions, the public does often form strong opinions regarding 
the individuals who should be engaged in those determinations.
212
 The current popular preference envisions Supreme Court 
adjudication as a higher discipline that entails appropriate judicial and 
legal experience to perform well.
213
 The public’s ideal Supreme Court 
nominee is experienced as a neutral arbiter applying established legal 
principles fairly and impartially to litigants. Two separate opinion polls 
conducted after Justice Souter retired but before President Obama 
announced his nomination of Judge Sotomayor establish the importance 
of judicial experience. In one poll, forty-five percent of Americans 
viewed judicial experience as the “single most important factor” in 
choosing a Supreme Court nominee, far outpacing shared ideology with 
the President or racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual orientation diversity.
214
Both polls revealed that approximately ninety percent of Americans 
consider prior service on the bench “important” for a nominee, a level of 
agreement no other qualification came even close to matching.
215
 Yet 
this prior judicial experience should not, in the public’s view, 
demonstrate an affinity to employ the judicial power to correct social 
inequities or promote social justice. A Rasmussen poll taken during 
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings indicated that eighty-three percent 
of those surveyed believe that the judiciary “should apply the law 
equally to all Americans rather than using the law to help those who 
have less power and influence.”
216
 A nominee preferred by the public, 
then, does not identify with particular litigants or issues, but instead is 
experienced in applying legal principles to presented factual 
circumstances without evident predispositions. 
 This predominant public ideal should not be a surprise, as it 
encapsulates the typical public justification of the judicial enterprise. As 
 212. Studies and polls during confirmation proceedings this century reveal that, during 
most nominations, close to nine in ten Americans formulate definitive opinions regarding 
whether a Supreme Court nominee should be confirmed. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory 
A. Caldeira, Confirmation Politics and the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Institutional 
Loyalty, Positivity Bias, and the Alito Nomination, 53 AM. J. POL. SCIENCE 139, 145 (2009) 
(finding that approximately nine in ten Americans had an opinion on Alito’s confirmation and 
his political ideology on an eleven-point scale). However, a larger percentage than usual had no 
opinion on whether Justice Kagan should be confirmed, with twenty-two percent having no 
opinion. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Favor Confirming Kagan to High Court, 44% to 34%,
GALLUP (July 15, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141329/americans-favor-confirming-kagan-
high-court.aspx.
 213. Cf. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 283. 
 214. Dana Blanton, Fox News Poll: Pick Supreme Court Justice Based on Experience, FOX
NEWS (May 14, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520209,00.html.
 215. Id.; CNN Poll: Race, gender not important in Supreme Court pick, CNN POLITICAL
TICKER (May 18, 2009, 6:16 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/05/18/cnn-poll-race-
gender-not-important-in-supreme-court-pick/.
 216. See Dahlia Lithwick, The Sotomayor Test: Will She Limit Obama’s Next Pick?,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 2009, at 27. 
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Alexander Hamilton opined in his defense in The Federalist of the 
entrustment of judicial review to a life-tenured federal judiciary, the 
Justices of the Supreme Court “should be bound down by strict rules 
and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them.”
217
 The Court’s power is merely 
its “judgment,”
218
 which must be according to law. Chief Justice John 
Marshall later similarly referred to courts as “the mere instruments of 
the law.”
219
 Modern political campaigns, especially but not exclusively 
on the Republican side, have emphasized a similar vision of restrained 
judicial decisionmaking.
220
 The same themes have also been reinforced 
during recent confirmation hearings, from Chief Justice Roberts’ 
umpire analogy to Justice Sotomayor’s disavowal of the influence of 
“feelings” on the judicial craft.
221
 While many citizens still appreciate 
the impact of a judge’s own jurisprudential philosophy, these repeated 
public statements have created a popular conception of the ideal judge 
as being constrained by legal rules that bar elevating personal values 
over the American constitutional tradition. 
 Nominees serving on the federal appellate bench typically epitomize 
these passive virtues. Once appointed to the bench, a federal appellate 
judge appears far removed from politics. The judge does not have to 
seek reelection, preventing any need for associating with political 
factions, raising money from special interests, or expressing personal 
preferences on issues of identity politics. The judge gains experience in 
both appellate judicial decisionmaking and analyzing legal principles in 
varied factual scenarios,
222
 but always with the plausible claim that the 
result was dictated not by the judge’s own preferences, but by binding 
Supreme Court or circuit precedent. As long as the judge refrains from 
needlessly indicating personal predispositions in judicial opinions or 
public fora, experience as a federal appellate judge matches the public’s 
current expectations regarding Supreme Court nominees. 
 This match is more difficult for modern state judges to achieve, 
despite a similar opportunity to engage in impartial and open-minded 
decisionmaking. Because approximately eighty percent of the states use 
 217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 196, at 471. 
 218. Id. at 465. 
 219. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824). 
 220. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional 
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 366-69 (2003). 
 221. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
 222. In this respect, a federal circuit court judge possesses better experience for the 
Supreme Court than a federal district judge. A federal district judge does not have nearly the 
opportunities to review decisions of other judicial officers, and even less opportunity to work 
with a collegial body in crafting opinions. There are also many more district court judges than 
federal court judges, making it more difficult for a district court judge to garner attention for 
impartial decisionmaking and judicial restraint. Otherwise, however, federal district judges do 
have the experience that the public perceives as beneficial for Supreme Court nominees. 
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popular elections to select at least some of their judges,
223
 state judges 
frequently must associate with political parties, raise campaign funds, 
and even express opinions on controversial topics. While candidates for 
judicial office used to be prohibited from announcing views on disputed 
legal or political issues by the judicial conduct codes of most states, the 
Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
224
 invalidated 
these prohibitions on free speech grounds.
225
 As a result, interest groups 
and voters now expect state judicial candidates to express their views 
on topics such as gay and lesbian rights, abortion rights, school prayer, 
and religious displays.
226
 The failure to do so in a contested election may 
be determinative to the outcome.
227
 Yet expressing views on these 
issues, especially if those views are designed to appeal to a particular 
constituent base, raises doubts regarding the role of such personal 
values in constitutional adjudication, particularly if the state judicial 
candidate is nominated for the Supreme Court. All the responding 
Republican candidates for open Texas Supreme Court seats in the 2010 
primary, for example, in answering the questionnaire of the Liberty 
Institute,
228
 expressed their disagreement with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Lawrence v. Texas,
229
Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe,
230
 and Roe v. Wade.
231
 While publicly 
announcing disagreement with these decisions may be necessary for 
election in a contested Republican primary in Texas, these critiques will 
spur vehement public opposition against the nomination of any of these 
candidates for the United States Supreme Court. 
 State judges avoiding these political pitfalls still have two other 
potential stumbling blocks on the path to a Supreme Court 
appointment. The first concerns the jurisdiction of their courts. Because 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the state courts is much broader than 
that of the federal courts,
232
 state judges only address the legal 
 223. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal 
Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 618, 618 n.294 (2007). 
 224. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
 225.  Id.
 226. See, e.g., LIBERTY INSTITUTE, FREE VOTERS GUIDE: 2010 GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2010) 
(on file with author) (publicizing judicial candidate responses to queries on the right of judges 
to display the Ten Commandments in the courtroom, the right to homosexual sexual 
relationships, abortion, and prayer at school football games). 
 227. See id. at 11 (noting “some candidates refused to answer our questionnaire despite our 
numerous communications with them. We listed their phone numbers and encourage you to 
call and ask them where they stand on these important issues.”). 
 228. See id. at 7. 
 229. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas criminal prohibition against same-sex 
sexual conduct). 
 230. 530 U.S. 2900 (2000) (disallowing prayer over the loudspeakers before Texas public 
high school football game). 
 231. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating Texas law banning abortions). 
 232. The subject matter jurisdiction of the state courts includes interpreting the state’s 
constitution and laws and developing the common law of contracts, torts, property, and family 
relationships, in addition to exercising concurrent power with the federal courts on certain 
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principles routinely considered by the federal courts in a small fraction 
of their cases, which means that state judges usually will have less 
familiarity and experience with these issues. Further, in the typical 
case not presenting a dispositive federal issue, state courts are immune 
from United States Supreme Court review, requiring state jurists to 
stake out their own positions on state constitutional, state statutory, 
and state common law matters. While this arguably provides a better 
window into the jurist’s approach to the judicial craft, the additional 
information may indicate predispositions raising public concern.
 State judges also have another disadvantage compared to federal 
appellate judges—national visibility. There are approximately 1300 
state court appellate judges in the United States,
233
 compared to only 
179 federal appellate court judges.
234
 In addition to their ranks being 
more than ten times smaller, federal appellate court judges have 
already navigated the federal appointment process at least once, 
obtaining familiarity with both the procedures and the relevant 
institutional actors. As a result, there may be an advantage for a state 
court judge to have at least some federal appellate court experience 
before being nominated for the Supreme Court.
235
 Without that 
experience, a state jurist—at least one who has exhibited fidelity to the 
public’s preferred vision of judicial restraint—is hard-pressed to attract 
the national stature for a Supreme Court nomination, unless the 
President is seeking a nominee with a precise combination of personal 
characteristics, experiences, and jurisprudential views that greatly 
reduces the potential pool of candidates.
236
issues of federal law. 
 233. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 42 BOOK OF THE STATES 298-301 (2010). 
 234. The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_of_appeals.html (last visited July 2, 2011).
 235. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 290-91 (discussing Justice Souter’s extremely 
short tenure on the federal circuit court before being nominated for the United States 
Supreme Court). 
 236. This occurred with both of the Supreme Court Justices appointed since 1955 directly 
from a state court. President Ronald Reagan promised during his presidential campaign he 
would appoint the “most qualified woman that [he] could possibly find” to fill one of the first 
Supreme Court vacancies in his administration. See Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing the 
Intention to Nominate Sandra Day O’Connor To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States (July 7, 1981), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, RONALD REAGAN, 1981 596 (1982). President Reagan also desired a candidate with 
demonstrably conservative judicial views, and the pool of conservative Republican women 
lawyers at the time—and especially judges—was pretty thin. Only forty-six women had been 
appointed as federal judges from 1789 until 1981, with forty of those receiving appointments 
from Democrat Jimmy Carter during the previous presidential term. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, 
at 264. As a result, it is not surprising that President Reagan turned to the state courts to find 
his preferred candidate. The same is also true, although probably to a lesser extent, with 
respect to President Eisenhower’s appointment of William Brennan in 1956, when the 
Republican President certainly appreciated the opportunity to appoint an experienced state 
court Democratic jurist of the Roman Catholic faith to shore up several vital constituencies 
before the election, such as Catholics and “Eisenhower Democrats.” KIM ISAAC EISLER, A
JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA
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 In contrast, the Solicitor General—the chief advocate for the United 
States before the Supreme Court—has the stature for an appointment, 
even though the decisionmaking expected of judges and the Solicitor 
General differs.
237
 By tradition and practice, the Solicitor General does 
undertake certain quasi-judicial determinations, which explains the 
common reference to the position as the “Tenth Justice.”
238
 These 
include an objective—rather than a partisan—appraisal of the 
constitutional and legal merits of every case the government appeals to 
determine whether the case is worthy of Supreme Court review.
239
 In 
addition, the Court specifically seeks the Solicitor General’s assistance 
by requesting the office’s views on approximately twenty cases each 
term.
240
 In some respects, then, the Solicitor General is “a silent partner 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” generally (but not always) 
tending to “mirror the Supreme Court’s institutional views about the 
role of law in our society and the special responsibility and expertise of 
the judiciary ‘to say what the law is.’ ”
241
 On the other hand, the 
Solicitor General still must answer to the Attorney General, and 
ultimately the President, unlike a federal judge.
242
 Moreover, the 
Solicitor General remains the lead appellate advocate for the 
government, even if his or her advocacy must be tempered to some 
degree by the Supreme Court’s expectations. Balancing these competing 
obligations is no easy task, but a Solicitor General who does fulfill the 
office’s quasi-judicial functions in an apolitical and nonpartisan manner 
has experience in the type of impartial decisionmaking that can satisfy 
public expectations for a Supreme Court nominee.
243
89-90 (1993). 
 237. By statute, the Solicitor General must be “learned in the law” and assist the Attorney 
General. Act of June 22, 1870, Ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). 
Over the 140 years since the creation of the position, the Solicitor General has been vested by 
both federal regulations and by practice with essentially exclusive authority to represent the 
United States before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rex. E. Lee, Lawyering in the Supreme 
Court: The Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1059, 1067 (1988). 
 238. Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices in the 
Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 572 (1988). This moniker, however, is not truly appropriate as 
the Supreme Court communicates with the Solicitor General through public external channels 
rather than through the internal deliberative process. 
 239. See, e.g., Paul D. Clement, The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J.
311, 314-23 (2009); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme 
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1495 (2008). 
 240. See Clement, supra note 239, at 328. 
 241. Burt Neuborne, In Lukewarm Defense of Charles Fried, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1069, 
1069 (1988). 
 242. 28 U.S.C. § 505. 
 243. Of the forty-five individuals confirmed by the Senate as Solicitor General, five have 
later served on the Supreme Court: William Howard Taft, Stanley Reed, Robert H. Jackson, 
Thurgood Marshall, and Elena Kagan, with Reed, Marshall, and Kagan being nominated for 
the Supreme Court during their tenure in the office. Office of the Solicitor General, About the 
Office, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/osg/aboutosg/ 
osghistlist.php (last visited July 2, 2011). The Senate Judiciary Committee highlighted the 
importance of this position in 1967 when reporting on the Supreme Court nomination of then-
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 Such expectations are almost impossible to satisfy, however, for 
modern nominees with extensive legislative or executive political 
backgrounds. Political officials typically must associate with partisan 
factions, seek money and support from special interests, and express 
personal preferences on political issues. Political officials do not act as 
neutral decisionmakers, but usually advocate for or work towards a 
particular policy goal. Because a politician’s appeals to and political 
representation of constituents does not necessarily indicate an approach 
to resolving judicial controversies, the public has very little information 
to ensure that, once elevated to the bench, the politician does not 
attempt to enshrine political policy preferences as the fundamental law 
of the land. 
 The racist statements Judges Parker and Carswell made during 
their respective political campaigns for elected offices in the South 
during the Jim Crow era provide a telling example.
244
 Although such 
sentiments were an unfortunate reality in southern politics at that 
time, and, at least in the case of Judge Parker, may not have evinced 
his true approach to adjudicating racial issues,
245
 the public could not be 
sure. Were Judge Parker’s racist statements solely political spin to 
obtain the governorship? Or were the statements his true guiding 
principles that he would seek to elevate to constitutional status if he 
served on the High Court? The doubt certainly justified the NAACP’s 
strident objections to his confirmation. Most elected and even appointed 
officeholders take stands on other divisive issues that may engender 
similar doubts in the minds of at least some of the public regarding 
their ability to maintain an impartial, nonpartisan approach to judging. 
 Presidents are certainly aware of the public’s preference for 
nominees with judicial experience evincing nonpartisanship and 
impartiality, as the use of polling data in the appointments process is 
now a common practice.
246
 Even Presidents, such as Bill Clinton, 
Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall: 
rarely in our history have we had a man who established a national reputation as 
a leading trial and appellate litigator, who then sat successfully on the Federal 
appellate bench and then served as the Government’s chief appellate litigator in 
the office of the Solicitor General. There can be no better preparation and 
qualification for the Supreme Court. 
Sen. Rep. No. 90-13, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Nomination of Thurgood Marshall 1 (1967).
 244. See supra Part II.C. 
 245. See MALTESE, supra note 69, at 59-69. After his defeated nomination, Judge Parker 
continued to serve on the court of appeals, where his judicial record on racial relations was, at 
least according to one of his opponents in the confirmation fight, “above reproach.” DONALD J.
LISIO, HOOVER, BLACKS, AND LILY-WHITES: A STUDY OF SOUTHERN STRATEGIES 229 (1985). Yet, 
on the other hand, Professor Lively has identified several objectionable decisions Judge Parker 
authored after his confirmation battle resisting desegregation of public schools. Donald E. 
Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional Roles and 
Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 570-72 (1986). 
 246. GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 214. 
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desiring to break the mold have reached the reluctant conclusion that 
the safest approach to ensure confirmation is nominating a federal 
appellate judge, or someone with analogous experience, with a fair-
minded reputation.
247
 Such nominees experienced in impartial 
decisionmaking most closely correspond with the public’s current 
conception of an ideal Supreme Court Justice, assisting the present 
sociological acceptance of the Court as an institution. 
 This is not to say that the sociological acceptance of the Supreme 
Court has always depended—or will always depend—on the public’s 
conception of the appropriate nominee. Prevailing American 
constitutional jurisprudential theory has not been consistent over 
time.
248
 Early Americans, for instance, often articulated a 
“departmental” constitutional theory, allowing each governmental 
organ to express its own constitutional views in the ordinary course of 
its affairs, with final constitutional authority vested in the citizenry,
249
who typically mobilized through political parties.
250
 The judicial function 
in some respects during this period was only marginally separated in 
both theory and practice from ordinary politics—partially explaining 
the rash of nineteenth century Supreme Court nominees rejected on 
purely partisan political grounds.
251
 The Supreme Court’s docket has 
likewise changed. For the first 150 years of its existence, the Supreme 
Court issued only a handful of decisions protecting individual civil 
rights and liberties outside the economic sphere.
252
 But then the Warren 
Court in the 1950s shifted the Court’s emphasis from commercial and
 247. Yalof, supra note 57, at 696-700. 
 248. See CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2007); see also Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Impact of American Lockean Constitutional 
Theory on Economic Markets, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 49, 50-51 (2008). 
 249. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-09 (2004). 
 250. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY ix-x (2004) (detailing voting practices in the nineteenth century, which depended on 
party affiliation as parties distributed “tickets” for voters to deposit in ballot boxes). 
 251. See supra Parts II.A-B. Of course, this view of judging had its downside. The public 
legitimacy and acceptance of the Court suffered at times, such as during the judiciary’s 
partisan enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 95-96 (2d. ed. 1994), after the horrid decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), which sullied the Court’s reputation for decades 
thereafter, see CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS, AN INTERPRETATION 50-51 (1936), and during the 
Civil War and the aftermath of Reconstruction. See Richard D. Friedman, The Transformation 
in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations: From Reconstruction to the Taft 
Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 8-20 (1983) (explaining how the Court’s 
participation in decisions regarding the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the legality of paper 
currency, along with Justices serving to resolve the disputed Hayes-Tilden presidential 
election of 1876, caused the Court to be predominantly viewed in partisan political terms). 
 252. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).  
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property concerns to safeguarding individual rights and employing legal 
principles to accomplish social objectives.
253
 As the objections of some politicians and segments of the public to 
the sociological impact of the Warren Court intensified, prior judicial 
decisionmaking experience became a preferred qualification for 
Supreme Court nominees.
254
 And in the years since the Court first 
became involved in many of the hot-button political identity issues that 
dominate today’s headlines, such as abortion, affirmative action, and 
gay and lesbian rights, almost every successful nominee has had 
judicial experience.
255
 While the judicial experience norm may be a 
relatively recent phenomenon in American constitutional history, the 
timing of its adoption corresponds with the Supreme Court’s increasing 
forays into issues of identity politics. 
 The public’s vision counsels moderation regarding these issues, 
rather than the elevation of visionaries to the High Court. Because 
almost all the Supreme Court Justices viewed as great did not have 
prior federal appellate judicial experience, and many did not have any 
previous relevant decisionmaking experience as a judge or in the office 
of Solicitor General, the modern norm for Supreme Court nominees 
appears somewhat counterintuitive at first blush.
256
 On the other hand, 
the elusive nature of Supreme Court greatness depends in large 
measure on the vantage point and perception of the beholder. Many of 
the great Justices were not always popular with the public in their own 
day (including Chief Justices Marshall and Warren), or were 
marginalized to a predominantly dissenting role (as was the case for the 
first Justice Harlan and Justice Brandeis).
257
 Much of juridical 
greatness is a matter of vision, being “on the right side as judged by 
subsequent history.”
258
 The reverence of Court watchers for previously 
inexperienced but visionary jurists has not influenced the general 
public’s current perception of the appropriate qualifications of Justices. 
And the current public perception of judiciousness provides the needed 
sociological acceptance of the Court, not the judgment of history. 
 The judiciousness envisioned for the ideal Supreme Court nominee 
requires more than mere past experience as a judge or in another 
neutral decisionmaking role. The confirmation percentage of nominees 
with prior judicial experience historically approximates the 
confirmation percentage for nominees without such experience; in fact, 
 253. KELSO & KELSO, supra note 248, § 14.2.4; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 277-85 (1993). 
 254. See supra Part II.C. 
 255. See id.
 256. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 42-44. 
 257. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 253, at 86, 187 & 251. 
 258. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1087-88 (2001). 
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all the twentieth century nominees who were not confirmed had 
previously served on the federal appellate bench.
259
 But the twentieth 
century’s rejected nominees all expressed views or performed actions 
that cast public doubt on their ability to remain impartial and within 
the expected judicial role. Judge Parker’s judicial decisions and his 
gubernatorial campaign speech caused labor groups and African 
Americans to doubt that he could be fair and impartial to their 
interests.
260
 Justice Fortas’ liberal voting record made conservatives 
doubt his impartiality, and his continued extrajudicial role in actively 
advising President Johnson while serving on the Supreme Court caused 
many to doubt his nonpartisanship.
261
 The judicial decisions of Judge 
Haynsworth and Judge Carswell were perceived by opponents as biased 
against labor and civil rights groups.
262
 Finally, Judge Bork had 
expressed strong opinions in his academic writings that certainly could 
cast doubt on his ability to have an open mind.
263
 These rejections 
demonstrate that appropriate prior experience alone is not sufficient—
the experience must also indicate the nominee appears to have an open 
mind without prejudices favoring immoderate viewpoints, as aptly 
illustrated by recent nominees who successfully navigated the process. 
C. The Path of Successful Nominees 
 The successful nominees since the Bork nomination share several 
characteristics. First, all were either sitting federal appellate court 
judges or the Solicitor General of the United States at the time of their 
nomination, and all had impeccable academic credentials and 
prestigious prior legal experience. Second, their prior judicial decisions 
and writings were well within the accepted boundaries of the 
mainstream, avoiding extreme positions. And finally, during their 
confirmation hearings, they refused to commit to specifics, instead 
offering generalities regarding their judicial philosophy and promises to 
maintain an open mind. 
 Justice Sotomayor provides a good example. She avoided expressing 
views on most currently controversial legal issues during her seventeen 
years as a federal district court and circuit court judge. She never had 
to rule on a case directly implicating the scope of constitutionally 
protected abortion rights.
264
 In the most high-profile racial 
 259. Circuit Effects, supra note 15, at 833. 
 260. See supra Part III.C. 
 261. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 226-27. 
 262. See supra Part III.C. 
 263. See supra Part III.D. 
 264. She was, however, involved in a few cases that were tangentially related to abortion. 
See, e.g., Center for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding 
federal government’s policy prohibiting foreign organizations receiving United States funds 
from performing or supporting abortions against free speech, due process, and equal 
protection challenges).
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discrimination case that came before her, she joined a per curiam order 
affirming the district court without any independent legal analysis, 
even though the Supreme Court viewed the case as important enough to 
grant certiorari and reverse.
265
 In her only Second Amendment case, 
Judge Sotomayor joined another per curiam opinion which followed 
existing Supreme Court precedent and refused to incorporate the 
Second Amendment to apply against the states.
266
 Thus, her 
perspectives on Supreme Court precedents in these areas prior to her 
confirmation were, to a large extent, unknown.
267
 The same could be said about her general legal philosophy. In 
opinions she authored, she avoided any indications of a grand judicial 
vision, the role of American history and tradition in legal meaning, or a 
preference for any particular modality of constitutional interpretation. 
Instead, her decisions embodied the judicial humility and restraint the 
public apparently desires in a Supreme Court Justice.
268
 Her opinions 
were thorough and well researched, almost comparable to a student 
authored law review article—exhaustive research on all legal 
propositions, frequently with lengthy footnotes, application of these 
principles to the controversy before her, and a narrow holding. 
 Her opponents, therefore, had to attack her based on the Justice they 
feared she would become on the Supreme Court rather than the judge 
she had been. The predominant complaint focused on her speeches and 
 265. Ricci v. DeStafano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). The panel 
members were taken to task by some members of the Second Circuit for failing to properly 
analyze the case. See id. (Cabranes, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 266. Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009). Although some Republicans seized on 
this opinion as a basis for opposition against her, the Second Circuit properly acted with 
judicial restraint in this case. Although certainly District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008), undercut the basis for the Supreme Court’s decisions in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 
(1886), and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not protect against state restriction of gun rights, the responsibility of a lower federal court 
is to follow even questionable Supreme Court precedent until it is overruled. Although the 
Supreme Court determined that Presser and Cruikshank were not controlling in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), this was a decision appropriate for the Supreme 
Court—rather than a lower federal court—to make. Interestingly, though, once on the 
Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor joined the dissent in McDonald, despite her statement 
during her confirmation hearing that she understood “the individual right fully that the 
Supreme Court recognized in Heller.” Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 11, at 60. 
 267. But see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3136 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & 
Sotomayor, JJ.) (arguing that “the Framers did not write the Second Amendment in order to 
protect a private right of armed self-defense.”).
 268. See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 368 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (“The duty of a judge is to follow the law, not to question its plain terms. I do not 
believe that Congress wishes us to disregard the plain language of any statute or to invent 
exceptions to the statutes it has created. . . . I trust that Congress would prefer to make any 
needed changes itself, rather than have courts do so for it.”) Notably, the Republican attacks 
on her jurisprudence focused on her failure to be more activist in protecting preferred 
conservative individual rights, i.e., reverse discrimination and gun rights, against 
governmental intrusions. See supra notes 265-266 and accompanying text; see also Sotomayor 
Hearing, supra note 11, at 7-8, 74-77, 86-94; Charlie Savage, Uncertain Evidence for ‘Activist’ 
Label on Sotomayor, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A10. 
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writings in which she had emphasized the role of her Latina 
experiences in judging.
269
 But this tactic was hindered when her 
opponents could not demonstrate that any of her judicial decisions in 
seventeen years evinced such biases.
270
 She was also faulted for the per 
curiam opinions on the racial discrimination and Second Amendment 
cases, but much of that criticism was blunted by those cases being 
unanimous and at least arguably based on binding precedent.
271
Although she might have been more vulnerable in the absence of her 
federal court service, her record was too much to overcome, especially in 
light of her testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
 Her testimony on the judicial role fit comfortably within the public’s 
preferred vision. She refused to subscribe to President Obama’s favored 
judicial quality of empathy, explaining that judges apply “law to facts,” 
not “feelings to facts.”
272
 She repeatedly reinforced a limited role for the 
judiciary, with the Court merely applying established legal principles 
from precedent to decide cases, with due deference to the political 
branches of government.
273
 Even her detractors on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee reluctantly admitted her testimony resembled their own 
preferences, but they still feared she would lose her restraint on the 
Supreme Court, leading thirty-one Senators to vote against her.
274
 Of 
course, it is conceivable they are correct.
275
 But in the meantime she has 
secured her place on the Supreme Court. 
 269. See, e.g., Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 11, at 16-18, 21 (statements of Senators 
Sessions, Grassley, Kyl, and Cornyn). 
 270. Cf. id. at 27 (statement of Senator Graham) (acknowledging that her prior judicial 
record did not indicate result-oriented rulings based on biases or prejudices). 
 271. See, e.g., id. at 7-8, 74-77, 86-94. 
 272. Id. at 120-21. In her prepared statement, she described her judicial philosophy as: 
fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is not to make law. It is to apply the law. 
And it is clear, I believe, that my record in two courts reflects my rigorous 
commitment to interpreting the Constitution according to its terms, interpreting 
statutes according to their terms and Congress’s intent, and hewing faithfully to 
precedents established by the Supreme Court and my circuit court. 
  In each case I have heard, I have applied the law to the facts at hand. The 
process of judging is enhanced with the arguments and concerns of the parties to 
the litigation are understood and acknowledged. That is why I generally structure 
my opinions by setting out what the law requires and then explaining why a 
contrary position, sympathetic or not, is accepted or rejected. That is how I seek to 
strengthen both the rule of law and faith in the impartiality of our judicial system. 
Id. at 59.
 273. See, e.g., id. at 59, 79, 95-96 120-21, 134-35, 346, 350.
 274. See Kane & Goldstein, supra note 11. 
 275. After her first year of service, her critics undoubtedly felt that their opposition was 
justified when, despite her intimations to the contrary during her confirmation hearing, she 
joined Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 
3136 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting), which contended that “the Framers did not write the 
Second Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed self-defense.” 
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 Justice Kagan did so as well. Although Justice Kagan never 
previously served in the judiciary,
276
 she likewise avoided expressing 
personal views on most pressing constitutional issues. Her law review 
articles generally avoided politically controversial topics, while 
exhibiting a careful understanding of opposing legal arguments and 
calculated restraint in articulating conclusions;
277
 in a number of 
respects these academic writings could be described as judicious, if not 
judicial.
278
 Because her academic writings and speeches provided little 
insight on her views on disputed legal issues, Senators opposing her 
nomination attempted to construct her positions from documents, 
papers, and memoranda she had authored while an associate White 
House counsel and deputy director of the domestic policy council for 
President Clinton, while a law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall, and 
even while an undergraduate and law student.
279
 But Solicitor General 
Kagan dismissed the relevance of these writings, repeatedly arguing 
that her own earlier political or personal views—or the views of her 
employers—were irrelevant to the process of judging, which is “law all 
the way down.”
280
 She repeatedly returned to the generally accepted themes she 
described in her opening statement, explaining that the judicial 
function requires considering the arguments of the parties with an open 
mind, safeguarding the rule of law, exercising judicial restraint, and 
rendering impartial justice.
281
 She pledged to “consider every case 
 276. She was nominated to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999 by 
President Clinton, but the Republican-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee took no action 
on her nomination. Lindeman, supra note 174, at 2779. 
 277. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech 
and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 878 (1993); Elena Kagan, The Changing 
Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of 
Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29 (1992). While her articles addressed 
some issues of controversy with the academy, the topics were not the culturally divisive 
political and legal issues, such as abortion, affirmative action, gay and lesbian rights, and gun 
rights. Further, even when she did address some specific issues that could be of political 
concern, such as pornography, hate speech, and student speech codes, her writing was more 
theoretical and analytical rather than offering concrete suggestions for establishing new legal 
doctrine.
 278. Indeed, at least one of her former colleagues at the University of Chicago had no 
qualms about expressing his conclusion that her scholarship demonstrated she was not a 
“natural academic.” Parsons, supra note 17 (quoting Richard A. Epstein). 
 279. See, e.g., Kagan Hearing, supra note 21, 2010 WL 2564591, at **6, 18, 23-24 (June 
28); 2010 WL 2600846, at **60-62 (June 29). Many Republican Senators also strongly criticized 
her decision as Harvard Law School Dean to have military recruiters work through a student 
veterans’ group rather than the school’s recruiting offices to seek to employ Harvard Law 
graduates. See, e.g., 2010 WL 2564591, at *6 (June 28); 2010 WL 2600871, at *136 (June 30). 
They also decried her “associat[ion]” throughout her career with “well-known activist judges.” 
See, e.g., 2010 WL 2564591, at *7 (June 28); 2010 WL 2600871, at **135-36 (June 30). 
 280. See, e.g., id., 2010 WL 2600846, at **14, 55, 139, 148 (June 29); 2010 WL 2600871, at 
**13, 131 (June 30). 
 281. Id., 2010 WL 2564591, at **65-66 (June 28). 
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impartially, modestly, with commitment to principle, and in accordance 
with law.”
282
 This pledge, she believed, necessitated deference to the 
political branches, a limited role for the courts, respect for precedent, 
and case-by-case decisionmaking, rather than attempting to further 
some grand judicial vision or theory.
283
 She articulated a pragmatic approach to constitutional 
interpretation, evaluating constitutional text, original intent, history, 
precedent, and underlying precedential principles, with the priority of 
these modalities dependent on the particular provision at issue.
284
 The 
judicial role fundamentally depends on the text and meaning of the 
Constitution, she continued, “[s]o in that sense, we are all 
originalists.”
285
 She referred to precedent as an “enormously important 
principle of the legal system,”
286
 which lends “predictability and stability 
in the law” and ensures judicial humility and constraint by ensuring 
that judges do not import inappropriate considerations into the 
decisionmaking process.
287
 As a result, it had to be “a very extraordinary 
circumstance or a very unusual circumstance for a court to overturn a 
precedent.”
288
 She opined that her pragmatic philosophy rejected the 
instrumentalist vision of constitutional evolution through judicial fiat.
289
 Even though she had not been a judge, she understood the Court 
should not be viewed as a political body, but as a nonpartisan 
adjudicator with exclusive allegiance to the rule of law.
290
 As evidence of 
her ability to be an open-minded, temperate, and balanced 
decisionmaker, she pointed to her experiences as Solicitor General and 
dean.
291
 She explained that the Solicitor General is a “legal officer,” who 
typically does not participate in “policy issues,” based on the “long and 
historic tradition that the solicitor general’s office has of representing 
the long-term interests of the United States government.”
292
 As a result 
of this role, she had a new-found appreciation and respect for both the 
institution and individual Justices on the Supreme Court.
293
 Despite the 
continued objections to her relative lack of “real world” experience and  
 282. Id. at *67; 2010 WL 2600846, at *24 (June 29). Although she originally stated that 
would be her sole pledge, she also pledged to reread The Federalist in response to questioning 
by Senator Coburn. Id., 2010 WL 2600871, at *113 (June 30). 
 283. See 2010 WL 2600846, at **112-13 (June 29). 
 284. Id. at **13-14, 78, 146; 2010 WL 2600871, at *97 (June 30). 
 285. 2010 WL 2600846, at * 5 (June 29). 
 286. Id. at *46. 
 287. Id. at **112, 128; see also 2010 WL 2600871, at *3 (June 30). 
 288. 2010 WL 2600846, at *145 (June 29). 
 289. Id. at *123. 
 290. 2010 WL 2600871, at *5-6 (June 30). 
 291. 2010 WL 2600846, at *26 (June 29). 
 292. Id. at **9, 147. 
 293. Id., 2010 WL 2600871, at **15, 107 (June 30). 
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her prior political positions, she was ultimately confirmed in a sixty-
three to thirty-seven vote.
294
 Other Justices who charted a similar course have also been 
confirmed over the last two decades. Judge Clarence Thomas’ sixteen 
months as a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
did not provide an indication of his legal philosophy, other than he was 
tough on crime.
295
 His appellate court opinions, like those of Judge 
Sotomayor, frequently “read as if they had been stripped of 
controversy.”
296
 During his 1991 confirmation hearing, he repeatedly 
asserted that discussing his views on legal issues would improperly 
“prejudge” them and interfere with the judicial craft.
297
 For example, 
while responding to more than seventy questions about abortion,
298
Justice Thomas consistently maintained he could not discuss Roe v. 
Wade without comprising his impartiality and he could not “remember 
or recall participating” in discussions about the case.
299
 He positioned 
himself during his testimony as “an open-minded moderate” without 
extreme positions.
300
 He discussed the “limited” role of judges in the 
American constitutional system and explained that he would refrain 
from approaching precedents “with any desire to change them.”
301
 He 
spoke of constitutional provisions evolving and moving “with our history 
and our tradition.”
302
 He pledged that, as a Justice, he would be “fair 
and impartial” without “preconceived notions” or “an agenda.”
303
 Many Senators had their doubts, however, attacking the 
conservative articles and speeches he made during his tenure as a civil 
rights official in the Reagan and Bush administrations.
304
 But he 
contended that these positions were a necessary part of his duties as an 
 294. Ralph Lindeman, Kagan Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice Two Days After Senate 
Confirmation, 79 U.S.L.WK. 1178 (Aug. 10, 2010). 
 295. JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 162 (1994). 
 296. Id.
 297. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 172-73 (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearing].
 298. KATZMANN, supra note 125, at 31; MALTESE, supra note 69, at 110-11. 
 299. Thomas Hearing, supra note 297, at 222-23. Within a year after his confirmation, he 
joined opinions stating that Roe “was wrongly decided” and “outrageous.” Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He has also 
described Roe as “grievously wrong,” Sternberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 980 (2000) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting), and joined an opinion stating that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence is “in 
stark contradiction of the constitutional principles we apply in all other contexts.” Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 742 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 300. Joyce A. Baugh & Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas: Confirmation Veracity 
Meets Performance Reality, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 455, 458 (1996). 
 301. Thomas Hearing, supra note 297, at 135. 
 302. Id. at 274. 
 303. Id. at 110. 
 304. See, e.g., id. at 451-52 (remarks of Senator Kennedy). 
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appointee in the executive branch, and distinct from his record as a 
judge.
305
 A judge, he emphasized, should be committed to stare decisis, 
because overruling a case is “a very serious matter,” requiring a judge 
to meet the “burden” of showing not only that the case is wrong, but 
that it is necessary to overrule it.
306
 He urged that the appropriate 
predictor of his tenure as a confirmed Justice was his modest and open-
minded record on the federal appellate bench.
307
 Although many 
Senators were not convinced, especially with the added controversy of 
Anita Hill’s sexual harassment charges against him, he was narrowly 
confirmed by the Senate in a fifty-two to forty-eight vote.
308
 Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg also pointed to her experience on the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals as evidence of her 
qualifications during her confirmation hearing in 1993.
309
 Her rulings 
during her thirteen years of service on the federal bench had been 
“relatively restrained,”
310
 following precedent without providing much 
insight as to her own views on many issues likely to be resolved by the 
Supreme Court.
311
 Her testimony during her confirmation hearing 
regarding the judicial role struck a familiar chord—“each case is based 
on particular facts and [the court’s] decision should turn on those facts 
and the governing law.”
312
 She described her approach to judging as 
“neither liberal nor conservative,” but instead “rooted in the place of the 
judiciary” in the American scheme to impartially administer the law in 
 305. Id. at 264-67. With respect to a couple of the more extreme positions he had 
apparently advocated, Justice Thomas testified that he had not fully read a report he signed 
that recommended, among many other suggestions, that the President appoint Supreme Court 
Justices to overrule Roe, and that he did not intend to indicate in a speech a position on 
abortion by praising an article “on the Declaration of Independence and the meaning of the 
right to life [as] a splendid example of applying” natural law. Id. at 127-31, 146. 
 306. Id. at 134-35, 246, 420. This has not been the case in practice, however, as even 
Justice Scalia has (probably unintentionally) implied that Justice Thomas is a “nut” for his 
willingness to overrule precedent that does not accord with his view of the original meaning of 
the Constitution. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 103 (2007). Empirical studies confirm that Justice Thomas has a relatively low 
commitment to precedent. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki et al., An Empirical Analysis of the 
Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
127, 139-40 (2007). 
 307. Thomas Hearing, supra note 297, at 264-67. 
 308. Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and 
Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 970 n.6, 985-91 (1992). 
 309. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 55 (1993) 
[hereinafter Ginsburg Hearing]. In addition to her thirteen years on the federal appellate 
bench, she also highlighted her past articles on procedure as a law professor and her advocacy 
for gender equality. See id. At least by the time of her nomination, there was nothing 
controversial about her pioneering role in litigating gender equality claims or her procedural 
articles that could be used against her. 
 310. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 306. 
 311. See, e.g., Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 752 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (holding judiciary powerless to create a cause of action permitting civil rights groups to 
sue federal officials for rights enforcement in the absence of congressional authorization). 
 312. Ginsburg Hearing, supra note 309, at 55. 
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“the cases before [the court] without reaching out to cover cases not yet 
seen.”
313
 She refused to subscribe to any role for personal values in 
judicial decisionmaking, instead articulating that the proper analysis 
depended on the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, as well as 
the history and traditions of the American people.
314
 With respect to the 
expected results of her jurisprudential philosophy in specified legal 
areas, she maintained she could not commit as she would be “open” to 
considering arguments and ideas.
315
 She accordingly reflected in most 
respects the public vision of a fair, impartial, and experienced jurist, 
and her confirmation was nearly unanimous.
316
 A similar approach was followed by the next nominee, Judge 
Stephen G. Breyer, the following year. His fourteen years on the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals also evinced mostly restrained judicial 
decisionmaking.
317
 His testimony during his confirmation hearing then 
reinforced the recurring themes from prior hearings. He emphasized 
the importance of precedent to the stability and legitimacy of the 
American legal system.
318
 He pledged to “consider with an open mind” 
the cases he would face because “there is nothing more important to a 
judge than to have an open mind and to listen carefully to the 
arguments.”
319
 A few Senators were nevertheless concerned that he had 
demonstrated favoritism to business interests in his prior appellate 
opinions and that he had failed to recuse himself from considering 
certain cases that might have indirect ramifications for his investments 
in Lloyd’s of London.
320
 Despite these concerns, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee viewed him as “a principled moderate pragmatist.”
321
 He 
accordingly was overwhelmingly confirmed, with nine dissenting votes.
322
 The next confirmation hearing did not occur for more than a decade, 
when Judge Roberts was nominated to be Chief Justice of the United 
States in 2005.
323
 Although he had served for only two years as a federal 
 313. Id. at 6. 
 314. Id. at 127 (“No judge is appointed to apply his or her personal values, but a judge will 
apply the values that come from the Constitution, its history, its structure, the history of our 
country, the traditions of our people.”). 
 315. See id.
 316. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 306.
 317. Id. at 311. 
 318. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d 
Cong. 82-83 (1994). 
 319. Id. at 113-14. 
 320. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 311. 
 321. Exec. Rep. 103-31, Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 103 Cong. 2 (1994). 
 322. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 39 (table 1) (eighty-seven to nine vote in favor 
of confirmation).
 323. See id. Judge Roberts was originally nominated to replace Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor as an Associate Justice, but that nomination was withdrawn and he was 
renominated for the position of Chief Justice after the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id.
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appellate judge on the District of Columbia Circuit, he urged that his 
decisions during that time should be the focus of the confirmation 
proceedings, and they were “not the opinions of an ideologue.”
324
 His 
testimony, as with prior nominees, focused on the judicial role 
generally, not his own views on disputed legal issues.
325
 He compared 
the judicial role to umpires, contending “umpires don’t make the rules; 
they apply them.”
326
 He had “no agenda” and “no platform” because 
“[j]udges are not politicians.”
327
 Instead, he wanted to be a “modest 
judge,” deciding only what was necessary to resolve cases in accordance 
with the law and “and the precedents of other judges that become part 
of the rule of law.”
328
 He pledged fidelity to precedent,
329
 promising to 
“confront every case with an open mind” and decide it according to the 
law.
330
 He was questioned regarding his ability to be open-minded in 
light of positions he had advocated during his service in the executive 
branch, but he distanced himself from his Justice Department positions, 
stating that was the work of a paid advocate, much different from his 
current role as a judge. As a judge, he maintained he had no 
“overarching judicial philosophy” and understood the necessity of 
deference to the legislative branch of government.
331
 Although some 
Senators were still concerned his past conservative record would 
manifest itself in his Supreme Court decisions on abortion, affirmative 
action, and other issues, he was easily confirmed in a seventy-eight to 
twenty-two vote.
332
 After the unsuccessful nomination of Harriet Miers, the next 
nominee was another sitting federal appellate court judge, Samuel A. 
Alito. Judge Alito had more than fifteen years of service on the Third 
Circuit, which opponents claimed indicated a too conservative 
jurisprudence on issues such as abortion, religious establishment, and 
affirmative action.
333
 During his testimony, however, he disavowed any 
conservative creed, iterating that his only obligation as a judge was to 
 324. Roberts Hearing, supra note 31, at 55. 
 325. See id. He probably understood the “rules” of confirmation better than most other 
nominees, as he had outlined a strategy for Sandra Day O’Connor to respond to the 
questioning of the Judiciary Committee when he was working in the Department of Justice in 
1981. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 318. Under this strategy, O’Connor refused to state how 
she “might vote on a particular issue which may come up before the Court” or to “endorse 
or criticize specific Supreme Court decisions which may well come before the Court again.” 
Hearing on the Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 57 (1981). 
 326. Roberts Hearing, supra note 31, at 55-56. 
 327. Id.
 328. Id. at 158-59, 177. 
 329. See id. at 142 (explaining that overruling precedents should be reserved for 
exceptional circumstances where a decision has proven clearly unworkable over time). 
 330. Id. at 56. 
 331. Id. at 281. 
 332. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 318-19. 
 333. Id. at 321. 
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the “rule of law” and doing “what the law requires.”
334
 He paid homage 
to precedent, describing it as “a fundamental part of our legal system” 
to “respect the judgments and the wisdom that are embodied in prior 
judicial decisions.”
335
 He pledged to approach questions not resolved by 
precedent with an “open mind.”
336
 He also distanced himself from his 
prior political work during the 1980s at the Justice Department, relying 
on differences between the executive and judicial roles. In the face of 
attacks on both his judicial and executive record, he was assisted by the 
testimony of seven current and former colleagues from the Third 
Circuit, who opined that he approached judicial decisionmaking 
impartially and with an open mind, rather than as an inflexible 
ideologue.
337
 The Senate eventually confirmed him in a relatively close 
fifty-eight to forty-two vote.
338
 An evident pattern emerges from these successful recent nominees. 
All have had the requisite decisionmaking experience, with elite 
backgrounds. The ones that have had the least difficulty being 
confirmed are those whose judicial records are perceived as relatively 
moderate, who have avoided overly partisan activities, and who have 
not expressed definitive opinions on the controversial issues of the day. 
The more the nominee’s past strays from this ideal, the more difficult 
the confirmation process becomes. This helps explain, for example, why 
Solicitor General Kagan did not receive the same level of public support 
as past successful nominees—although the quasi-judicial obligations of 
the Solicitor General may be understood by Senators on the Judiciary 
Committee, the lack of judicial experience complaint raised by some of 
her opponents resonated with a number of the public.
339
 It also helps 
explain why Judge Alito’s confirmation vote was so much closer than 
the vote for Judge Roberts—Roberts’ opinions in his short tenure on the 
federal appellate bench had been more nondescript, while there was 
more evidence of Alito’s conservative bent.
340
 Yet Justice Alito was still 
 334. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2006). 
 335. Id. at 318-19. 
 336. Id. at 322. 
 337. Id. at 654-82. Professor Clark has noted that ten Senators voting in favor of 
confirmation cited the testimony of his colleagues as a factor in their decision. See, e.g., Mary 
L. Clark, My Brethren’s (Gate) Keeper? Testimony by U.S. Judges at Others’ Supreme Court 
Confirmation Hearings: Its Implications for Judicial Independence and Judicial Ethics, 40 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1192 (2008). 
 338. RUTKUS & BEARDEN, supra note 66, at 39 (table 1). 
 339. Cf. Jones, supra note 23. 
 340. Another important factor was the judicial philosophy of the Justice being replaced. 
The replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist by Chief Justice Roberts did not appreciably 
change the balance of the Court, while the replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito 
has presumably altered the result in a number of cases. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Garcetti v. 
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narrowly confirmed, probably owing in part to the testimony and 
support of his judicial colleagues, who reinforced the ideal—that his 
judicial decisionmaking record evidenced an open mind, impartiality, 
and the fair and even-handed application of the law. 
 The final piece of the confirmation puzzle is that the nominee’s 
testimony before the Committee must repeatedly reinforce his or her 
commitment to these desired judicial traits. The nominee should avoid 
personal commentary on any disputed legal issues during the 
confirmation hearings, because such testimony will be seized upon by 
opponents as evidence of a predisposition on the controversial issues 
that will come before the Court. That is not what the public—now a 
critical actor in the confirmation process—desires or expects in a 
Supreme Court Justice. 
IV. FROM PAST LESSONS TO THE FUTURE PATHS OF THE
CONFIRMATION PROCESS
 Overlapping descriptive and normative tales are at the heart of this 
Article. The descriptive portion illustrated the burgeoning opportunities 
for public involvement in the Supreme Court appointments process and 
the resulting impact on confirmation outcomes. After the Seventeenth 
Amendment made Senators accountable to citizens, the Senate, through 
a slow process of evolution, opened its confirmation practices to public 
scrutiny and debate. The public often did not avail itself of these 
opportunities at first. But as the Court’s opinions impacted daily 
American life more frequently, the public’s involvement expanded. The 
testimony of nominees became standard practice in 1955, immediately 
after Brown; public interest group participation and more intensive 
Committee questioning became the norm after 1967, as political 
opposition to the Warren Court intensified; and public interest group 
input and media attention reached new heights when the proceedings 
were televised and the Court’s decisions ignited volleys in the culture 
wars. At each stage of progression, the likelihood that a nominee was a 
sitting appellate court judge or had analogous experience escalated, 
until such experience became an expectation.
 My normative narrative attempts to explain the interconnecting 
pieces of the descriptive tale. Public acceptance of the Supreme Court as 
an institution is required for its controversial decisions impacting 
identity politics to be respected. Although the public has minimal 
understanding of the judicial process, there is a shared conception of the 
background experiences and qualifications a Supreme Court Justice 
needs to ensure that the judicial craft is distinct from the ugly game of 
politics. The Supreme Court, in the public’s view, demands prior 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
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experience in fair, impartial, and nonpartisan decisionmaking to 
achieve the ideal—justice blindly balancing the merits of opposing 
positions championed by advocates. 
 But there is an undoubted tension between this public ideal and the 
competing objectives of Presidents, Senators, and various interest 
groups in the appointments process. In an attempt to comport (at least 
superficially) with the public’s vision, Presidents have for the last four 
decades turned to nominees who possessed the publicly accepted 
background experience, avoided any extreme legal positions, and then 
testified to the need to decide cases with an open mind and without 
either a liberal or conservative bent. Yet Presidents still usually desire 
to influence the Supreme Court, and therefore seek to fill vacancies 
with Justices that at some level share their jurisprudential 
philosophy.
341
 No serious person really believes, for instance, that the 
“balls and strikes” called by Justice Sotomayor will correspond in 
controversial cases with the calls of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito, despite the similarities in their confirmation testimony.
342
 So we find ourselves at an uneasy crossroad, with ever increasing 
tension between the public ideal and the frequently unstated (but 
nonetheless commonly recognized) objectives of the institutional actors 
in the appointments process. Although I will not offer a prescriptive 
recommendation here, two divergent paths for the confirmation process 
might alleviate this current tension. 
 One would be to modify the public’s conception of the ideal Supreme 
Court nominee and the process of judging, at least to the extent that 
candidly discussing the impact of various jurisprudential philosophies 
on judicial outcomes would not disqualify nominees from confirmation. 
If the public came to expect that nominees would be forthcoming in 
their discussion of their constitutional understanding and how that 
understanding might impact the resolution of constitutional issues, the 
code words and hidden motivations in the appointments process would 
no longer serve their current purpose. But it is no easy task to change 
public expectations. President Obama made an attempt to modify the 
prevailing ideal with several iterations of the need for “empathy” in 
constitutional interpretation,
343
 but even his nominees found the 
 341. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 3-5. 
 342. The evidence so far confirms that these Justices have different understandings of 
constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Christian Legal 
Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(2010); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); 
Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 343. See, e.g., The President’s Remarks on Justice Souter (May 1, 2009, 4:23 PM), 
http://whitehouse.gov/blog/09/05/01/The-Presidents-Remarks-on-Justice-Souter/ (“I view that 
quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles as an 
essential ingredient for arriving as [sic] just decisions and outcomes.”); 151 CONG. REC.
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necessity (presumably with his blessing) of distancing themselves from 
that approach.
344
 Another alternative would be for the Senate to enforce the public’s 
current expectations by rejecting any candidate—by filibuster, if 
necessary—whose past indicated any partisan predispositions that 
might influence judicial outcomes. In essence, the presumption would 
be against the nominee, who could rebut the presumption only by 
establishing a prior record of—and future commitment to—nonpartisan, 
open-minded decisionmaking comporting with the public ideal. The 
hope would be to constrain Presidents, requiring them to nominate for 
the Supreme Court only those with cross-party appeal. This, however, 
would also not be an easy task. It would require long-term 
commitments by Senators to refrain from seeking partisan advantage in 
Supreme Court appointments, and would inevitably lead to a 
showdown with the President, with the public at large presumably 
deciding the ultimate victor. 
 As a result, the immediate future probably will proceed along the 
same path we are on today. Although the public apparently prefers a 
judge above politics, there is an awareness that, to some extent, politics 
nevertheless matters immensely in the appointments process, despite 
frequent platitudes about choosing the “best qualified” candidate 
without imposing any litmus tests. But until a competing vision of the 
judicial role is embraced by the public, which either allows the candid 
consideration of judicial philosophy or compels strict adherence to a rule 
of law divorced from politics, the supreme appointment will continue to 
favor sitting appellate court judges (or those with analogous experience) 
who have not accumulated a paper trail on the controversial issues of 
the day. 
S10365-66 (2005) (statement of Senator Obama regarding the nomination of Chief Justice 
Roberts) (“The tough cases can only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s 
core concerns, one’s broader perspective on how the world works and the depth and breadth of 
one’s empathy”). 
 344. See supra Part I. 
